JUDGMENT

1. The dispute between the parties to this appeal, who are husband and wife, is as to whether the conjugal relations between them still subsist. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the wife, the plaintiff-respondent, for the recovery of her dower, her moveables in the possession of her husband, the defendant-appellant, or their value, and her maintenance during iddat, The claim was brought on the allegation that she had been lawfully married to the defendant some years ago and had lived with him as his wife up to the 8th of September 1913, when he divorced her at the railway station at Allahabad as she was going with her parents to Mahoba against his wishes. The defendant admitted the marriage, but denied the alleged divorce. He further pleaded that the words used by him at the railway station on the 8th of September 1913 did not in law have the effect of a valid divorce and in any case he had the option of revocation which he exercised within the prescribed period. The Court of first instance believed the story of the plaintiff and repelled all the pleas in defence. It found on the evidence in the case that the defendant had on the 8th of September 1913 addressed words of repudiation three times in immediate succession to his wife, which had the effect of a valid divorce under the Muhammadan Law. As to the plea of revocation it held that the defendant as a matter of fact did revoke the divorce, but he had no option of revocation as he had pronounced a triple divorce which was irrevocable. The claim was accordingly decreed and on appeal the decree of the first Court was affirmed. In second appeal to this Court the husband contends that the divorce he pronounced on the 8th of September 1913 was not under the Muhammadan Law. a valid divorce, and if it was, he had the option of revoking it. He impeaches the validity of the divorce on the ground that under the Muhammadan Law the only effective divorce is and should be that which is pronounced in the form and under the conditions sanctioned by the sunna or the traditions, and any other mode of divorce which is inconsistent with them or disregards the qualifications laid down by them does not dissolve the marriage. In the present case the divorce pronounced by the appellant was admittedly not in accordance with the form sanctioned by the sunna and hence was inoperative. It is conceded on behalf of the appellant that other modes of divorce at variance with those authorized by the traditions have also been recognised by the Muhammandan Jurists as valid forms of repudiation and that the divorce pronounced by the defendant was in one of those forms. But they are, it is argued, innovations introduced by the jurists to oblige the Ommeyyade Caliphs who wanted greater facility and easier rules of repudiation, and should not be recognised. In fact one of the forms recognised by the jurists and which was the mode of divorce in the present rase was distinctly disapproved of by the Prophet, Reliance is placed by the appellant in support of his contention on Mr. Ameer Ali's book on Muhammadan Law. The passages cited to us are to be found in Volume II, page 514, and are as follows: "The Talak-ud-Bidaat, as its name signifies, is the heretical or irregular mode of divorce, which was introduced in the second century of the Muhammadan Era. It was then that the Ommeyyade monarchs, finding the checks imposed by the Prophet on the facility of repudiation galling, looked about for some escape from the strictness of the law and found in the pliability of the jurists a loophole to effect their purpose. As a matter of fact the capricious and irregular exercise of the power of divorce which was in the beginning left to the husbands was strongly disapproved by the Prophet, It is reported that when once news was brought to him that one of his disciples had divorced his wife, pronouncing the three talaks at one and the same time, the Prophet stood up in anger on his carpet and d