ORDER

1. This is an application in revision against an order of the Additional Munsif of Gorakhpur, dated 8th March 1933, in a suit by the applicant against the opposite party. The suit arises out of an arbitration award. On. 25th April 1929, defendants 1 to 3, in the suit, executed a promissory note in. favour of defendant 4. On 19th December 1931, defendant 4 transferred the promissory note to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought the suit on the basis of the proraissory note against defendants 1 to 3, and he also impleaded defendant 4.

2. Defendants 1 to 3 and the plaintiff agreed to have the question in dispute between them settled by arbitration. An arbitrator was appointed by the Court who heard evidence and arguments on behalf of the parties and finally issued an award in favour of defendants 1 to 3. As a result of this award the learned Munsif passed the order against which this application is preferred. The order is in these terms:

It is therefore held that the award is valid so far as it adjudicates matters between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 3. As there was no reference by plaintiff and defendant 4, so the matters between them could not be decided by arbitrator. The Court will fix a date for final disposal of the case between plaintiff and defendant i.

3. Learned Counsel for the applicant has invited us to set aside this order upon the following grounds, viz. : (1) that the reference to arbitration is invalid inasmuch as defendant 4 was not a consenting party thereto, (2) the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct inasmuch as he did not disclose to the party the fact that he was indebted to the father-in-law of defendant 1. In support of his contention that the reference to arbitration was invalid because of the non-concurrence therein of defendant 4, he has referred us to three decisions of this Court in Gopal Das Vs. Baij Nath and Others , Tej Singh and Another Vs. Ghasi Ram and Others and Abudar Beg Vs. Nathumal and Another, AIR 1933 All 739 . He has contended that upon the basis of these decisions the reference in the present case is invalid, because all parties who were interested in the suit within the meaning of para. 1, Schedule 2, Civil P.C., had not agreed to the arbitration. Para. 1 is in the following terms:

Where in any suit all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between thorn shall be referred to arbitration, they may, at any time before judgment is pronounced apply to the Court for an order of reference.

4. We are of opinion that the two earlier decisions referred to by learned Counsel for the applicant do not support the wide proposition which he has invited us to accept, namely, that in all cases before there can be a valid reference to arbitration, all the parties to the suit, no matter what the nature of the suit is, must agree to the reference. The cases, reported in Gopal Das Vs. Baij Nath and Others and Tej Singh and Another Vs. Ghasi Ram and Others , are partition cases, and there can be no doubt that in such cases all the parties to the suit are vitally interested in questions in relation to the partition which may be referred by the plaintiff and some of the defendants to arbitration. It is only right therefore that if the questions raised in the suit for partition are to be submitted to the decision of an arbitrator, all the parties should agree to the reference.

5. The decision in Abudar Beg Vs. Nathumal and Another, AIR 1933 All 739 , which is a Single Judge decision, does at first sight appear to support the argument of the learned Counsel for the applicant. In that case, as in the present case, a promissory note had been executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant. The second defendant assigned the promissory note to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a suit. The relief claimed against the defendant was that in case the first defendant be found to have made any payment to the second defendant in respect of the promissory note, a decree be pass