1932 Supreme(All) 243
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
C.J, SULAIMAN, JJ.
Shri Kishan Lal & Ors. - Appellants
Versus
Bijai Singh & Ors. - Respondents
Decided On : 07-06-1932
Act Referred
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT : S.52
JUDGMENT
Sulaiman, C.J. - This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit brought by the land-holder for a declaration that the property in dispute, which is a grove land, was not liable to be sold in execution of a money decree against the landholder's grove-holder and for possession of the property. In substance the plaint is for the ejectment of the purchaser of the grove on the allegation that such a transfer was invalid and the land-holder was entitled to recover possession of the grove. The defendant pleaded that the grove was transferable as there was no custom prohibiting such a transfer. There was no plea taken that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiff however put forward the case that there was a custom prohibiting transfers of groves. The suit was instituted on 6th September 1927, after the coming into force of the new Tenancy Act, and the auction sale of the grove also took place shortly after the coming into force of the new Act. The first Court dismissed the suit but on appeal the lower appellate Court has given the plaintiff a decree against the auction-purchaser on the ground that there is a custom under which sales of grove are prohibited.
2. In second appeal the pokit is taken that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As the point goes to the root of the matter and is one of jurisdiction, and as an appeal would lie to the Commissioner if a suit were filed in the Revenue Court, we are bound to lentertain this objection if it is valid. The question of costs however is another matter. In Section 3(2), Agra Tenancy Act, land" means land which is let or held for agricultural purposes, or as grove-land or for pasturage. It is clear that a grove under the new Act is land within the meaning of the Act. It is also clear that u/s 197 (a) a grove-holder is a non-occupancy tenant. It follows that u/s 3, 01. (8) a grove is a holding. On the plaintiff's own showing there is a custom under which transfers are prohibited, with the result that no transfer can take place u/s 197 (b). It follows that the holding would be nontransferable u/s 33 and also u/s 34 of the Act. It then follows that according to the case put forward by the plaintiff there has been a transfer in contravention of the two sections and it is therefore void u/s 34 (l). But Section 82 provides that if a tenant transfers his holding or any portion thereof contrary to Sub-section (l), Section 34, both he and any person who may have obtained possession of the whole or any portion of of the holding in pursuance of any such attempted illegal transfer, shall be liable to ejectment at the suit of the landholder, and to every such suit both the tenant and the transferee shall be made parties.
3. It is therefore obvious that if Section 82 were applicable to the transfer of a grove in execution of a decree and were not confined to voluntary transfers by the tenant, the land-holder can sue both the tenant and the transferee in the Revenue Court. It would then follow that adequate relief could be claimed in the Revenue Court. As a suit for such relief would be expressly provided for in 8. 82, no other Court but the Revenue Court can take cognizance of such a suit. This is made clear by Section 230. The explanation to that section shows that if the cause of action is one in respect of which adequate relief might be granted by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil Courts may not be identical with that which the Revenue Court could have granted. The learned counsel for the respondents however contends that the provisions of Section 82 cannot apply to a sale in execution of a decree. There is no doubt that if the words were to be taken too literally, there may be some force in this contention, but it seems to as contrary to the general policy of the legislature, as indicated is the various sections of the Act, to hold that there is a distinction between a voluntary and an involu