JUDGMENT

Ghulam Hasan and Kaul, JJ. - These appeals were referred by one of us u/s 14(2) of the Oudh Courts Act for disposal by a Bench of this Court.

2. A preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the appeals on behalf of the Respondent. In order to properly appreciate this objection it is necessary to set out the facts briefly. The Plaintiff-Appellant filed two suits u/s 108(2) of the Oudh Rent Act before the Assistant Collector of the second class on the 15th June 1938. The rent was paid by the Defendant-Respondent during the pendency of the suit and the Assistant Collector, therefore, decreed the suits for sway items only. The suits were decreed on the 25th February and the 8th March, 1939. Two appeals were preferred to the Collector u/s 116(a) and both were dismissed on the 13th July, 1939. Appeals were taken to the District Judge on the 19th September, 1939, u/s 119A and they were allowed on the 7th May, 1940, with the result that both the suits were dismissed, The Plaintiff has preferred a third appeal in each of the two cases u/s 269 of the U.P. Tenancy Act No. XVII of 1939. the objection raised on behalf of the Respondent is that no third appeal can lie.

3. It is agreed that if the right to appeal is governed by the old Oudh Rent Act, these appeals are not maintainable, and this is settled by a decision of the Full Bench in Goya Prasad v. Kalap Nath 1 It was also held there that no revision lies u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, urged that the new Act applies and u/s 269 an appeal lies to this Court from the appellate decree of a District Judge on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (See Section 269). We are of opinion that the preliminary objection has force and must be upheld.

4. Section 269 in our opinion, cannot be availed of by the Appellant to confer on him a right of third appeal. A reference to a few of the preceding sections will make the position at once clear. Section 263 lays down that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any Court under this Act except as provided in this Act. It is obvious that before an appeal can be entertained against a decree or order it must be shown that the decree or order is passed by any Court under the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939) and under no other. Section 264 allows an appeal to the Collector from every decree of the Assistant Collector of the second class No appeal appears to have been provided against the appellate decree of a Collector except to the limited extent mentioned in Section 266, which permits an appeal to the District Judge from the appellate decree of the Collector in any suit in which a question of jurisdiction has been decided and is in issue in appeal, i.e. if the question of jurisdiction has not been decided by the Collector in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction and the same is not in issue in appeal before the District Judge the order of the Collector passed u/s 264 must be regarded as final and conclusive. Section 265 clearly permits an appeal to the District Judge from the Original decree of the Assistant Collector first class or of the Collector in a certain class of suits and to the Commissioner in certain other classes. Sub-section (3) of this section also allows an appeal to the District Judge from the original decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class or of the Collector in all suits, in which a question of jurisdiction has been decided and is in issue in appeal. Section 267 gives a right of an appeal to the Board from the appellate decree of the Commissioner. Section 269 authorizes an appeal to the High Court from the appellate decree of a District Judge passed u/s 266 and in no other case, Learned Counsel for the Appellant made a feeble attempt to show that the words of Section 259 were not subject to any restriction and the appellate decree of a District Judge passed under whatever law was appeasable to the Hi