JUDGMENT

Lindsay, J. - This case involves the interpretation of Section 326 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act (United Provinces Act No. II of 1916). The suit out of which this application has arisen was brought by the plaintiff-petitioner, Lala Makhan Lal, against the Municipal Board of Agra. The claim was to recover a sum of Rs. 218-16-6. According to the facts set out in the plaint the plaintiff is a cloth dealer in Agra who at various times had exported from Agra cloth of considerable value. He claimed that he was entitled, by reason of this export, to have from the Municipal Board a refund of octroi duty. He put in a claim to the Board and his case is that the Board refused to pay to him the full amount to which he was entitled. The balance, which, he said, was owing to him from the Municipal Board, came to Rs. 218-10-6. In paragraph 6 of the plaint, it was stated that the cause of action had arisen on the 31st of October 1917 when the Board refused to pay him the balance claimed.

2. One of the pleas which was raised by way of defence was that the suit was barred by limitation. This was founded on the pro-vision of Sections 326 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, Sub-section (3). The Court below gave effect to the plea and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that it was time barred. I am concerned. here with any other pleas which were raised in the written statement. The argument, before me is that the Court below misinterpreted Section 326 and was wrong in holding that the suit was barred by limitation.

3. The law relating to the refund of octroi duty is contained in statutory rules which were made under the provisions of the Municipalities Act. On referring to the Municipal Manual, Volume II, page 21, paragraph 73, I find it stated that 'a person who exports from a Municipality any goods on which, if they were being imported, octroi would be leviable shall be entitled to receive payment of a sum equivalent to that octroi. This payment (the rule declares) shall be described as refund." It seems dear, therefore, that under the provisions of these rules, which have the force of law, a legal duty is imposed upon a Municipal Board to grant a refund of octroi duty in the cases contemplated by the rules and with the duty a corresponding right arises in favour of the exporter.

4. Turning now to the provisions of Section 326 of the Municipalities Act we find that Sub-section (1) provides for the giving of notice of intention to sue when any person desires to institute a suit against a Board, or against a member, officer or servant of a, Board, in respect of an Act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity. The sub section requires that a notice of the claim shall be given in the manner prescribed in the sub section but with these provisions of this Sub-section we are not concerned. Coming then to Sub-section (3) we find it laid down that " no action such as is described in Sub-section (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of Immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action." It is obvious that the actions referred to in Sub-section (3) are the suits which are referred to in sub-section (1), and it was by applying the terms of Sub-section (3) to the facts of this case that : the Court below came to the conclusion that the suit was barred. In order to avoid the application of this special law of limitation it was argued in the Court below that the plaintiff was not seeking damages or compensation and consequently the suit was not a suit of the nature described in Sub-section (1), the result being that the period of limitation laid down in sub- Section 3 could not be applied. The same argument has been repeated here, though in a somewhat different form. It has been contended that Section 326, Sub-section (1), refers only to suits arising out of acts done inadvertently or i