JUDGMENT

Karamat Husain, J. - The facts are these. Musammat Kalandari Begam, one of the heirs of Musammat Gujrati Begam, deceased, applied for a Succession Certificate for the collection of a portion of the dower debt of Gujrati Begam. Her husband Ghaffoor Khan objected that no certificate for the collection of a portion of a debt could be granted.

2. The learned District Judge overruled the objection and granted the certificate. In his order, dated the 18th of February 1910, he said: "I think the applicant is entitled to the certificate applied for by her for the balance of the dower debt after deducting the share of the same to which the objector is entitled and which is in his hand and of the share of Musammat Sahib Jan another heir which has become time-barred."

3. The objector preferred an appeal to this Court and repeated the pleas he had raised in the Court below. The case owing to conflict of authorities was heard by a Bench of three Judges. It was urged for the appellant that a Succession Certificate for a portion of a debt could not be granted. In support of the contention reliance was placed on the following cases:

4. Muhammad Ali Khan v. Puttan Bibi 19 A. 129 and Bismilla Begam v. Tawassul Husain 32 A. 335 : 7 A.L.J. 256 : 5 Ind. Cas. 424.

5. The contention of the respondent was that a Bench of this Court in Akbar Khan v. Bilkisara Begam C.W.N.(1901) 125 granted a succession certificate for a portion of a dower debt and that the remarks of Edge, C.J. in Mohammad Ali Khan v. Puttan Bibi 19 A. 129 favoured the grant of a certificate for the collection of a portion of a debt. They are as follows:

It appears to us that the applicant must pay the duty for a certificate entitling him to collect the whole of the dower debt which at the date of the application was due and payable. In calculating what the amount of that debt was, the son's share by inheritance which has been discharged and the husband's share which he holds in his own hands in satisfaction of his own share in the inheritance, will be deducted, and the duty will be payable on the balance.

6. The decision of the case turns upon the construction to be put upon Section 4 of the Succession Certificate Act with special reference to the meaning assigned to the phrase "his debt" in that section.

7. Before dealing with the section, the following points are to be noted. The Succession Certificate Act, 1889, as the preamble shows, has been enacted to "afford protection to parties paying debts to the representatives of deceased persons."

8. The proceedings under the said Act are of a summary nature in which the Court either decides the right of the applicant to the certificate or grants it to one who appears to have the best prima facie title thereto (section, 7).

9. In certain cases the Court must, and in others it may, require, as a Condition precedent to the granting of a certificate, a bond for indemnity of persons who may be entitled to the whole or any part of the debt (see Section 9). It is thus evident that the proceedings are, in no way, intended to determine the share of the applicant in the debt or to adjudicate upon the relative rights of the applicant and others therein.

10. This is not all. One debt creates one single and indivisible liability which gives rise to one single cause of action. One of the heirs of the obligee of a money bond in may not, therefore, sue for his share in the money due under the bond. See Kandhiya Lal v. Chandar 7. A. 313. The dower debt of a Muhammadan wife, whether prompt or deferred, is a "debt" within the meaning of Section 2 of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889. Abdul Karim Khan v. Maqbul-un nissa 30 A. 315 : C.W.N. (1908) 113 : 5 A.L.J. 598.

11. A debtor, again, ought not to be harassed more than once for one debt and the multiplicity of suits in respect of one cause of action must not be allowed.

12. Some of the above-mentioned joints, among others not mentioned, brought into being Act XXVII of 1860, under; which the Calcutta. High