ORDER

T.S. Misra, J. - This is a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution. The material facts may be stated in a short compass The Petitioner filed a suit for division of holdings against opposite parties Nos. 4 to 6 in respect of plots Nos. 748/3, 795 and 800 situate in village Mooda Buzurg, Distt. Lakhimpur Kheri. It appears that on 9-5-1962, a compromise petition was filed before the trial court, which passed a preliminary decree in terms thereof. On the same day, one Hardwari Lal filed an application before, the trial court that plot No. 795 had been transferred to him by Mohan Lal and he should be impleaded as a party to the suit. On 10-5-1962, the trial court ordered that Hardwarf Lal be impleaded as a party to the suit and the faint may be amended accordingly it also fixed 30-5-1962 for filing a written statement and framing of issues. Thereafter, the trial of the suit proceeded. The written statement was filed and issues were framed. The trial court ultimately passed another preliminary decree on 14-5-1963. Against this decree, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commr. who dismissed the same. A second appeal preferred by the Petitioner before the Board of Revenue was also dismissed. The Petitioner also sought to, have the order reviewed by the Board, but the same was not allowed. The Petitioner has now come to this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the orders of the trial court, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue and for such direction as may be deemed fit and proper.

2. The main contentions of the Petitioner in support of the petition have been three-fold. It was urged, firstly that opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 had no jurisdiction to pass a second prelim nary decree without setting aside the first preliminary decree, secondly, that the trial court had no jurisdiction to implied a third party in the suit after the preliminary decree had been passed and thirdly that opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for damages, in a suit filed u/s 229-B/176 of the UP ZA and LR Act. I shall take up these contentions in seriatim.

3. The first contention of the learned, counsel for the Petitioner was as indicated above, that having passed a preliminary decree on the basis of the compromise, the trial court had no jurisdiction to pass another preliminary decree in the same suit without setting aside the first one and which according to him, was inconsistent with or contrary to the first preliminary decree. The suit was filed for division of holdings u/s 229-B read with Section 176 of the UP ZA and LR Act. It is a settled law that in suit for partition of immovable property, scares and rights of respective parties in the subject-matter of the suit may, in certain circumstances be suitably modified or varied even if a preliminary decree had been passed in the suit. In fact, it would be equitable, fair and just and even advantageous to the parties in a suit for partition or division of holdings to have all the disputed claims and rights effectually and completely adjudicated upon and finally determined in the suit and the shares finally specified in the preliminary decree which may be amended, varied or modified before a final decree is passed. Whether the court passed a decree for partition of the property, division of the holdings, or for the separate possession of shares therein, it does so after determining the rights and shares of the parties interested in the property, as required by Rule 157 of the UPZA and LR Rules or by Rule 18 of Order XX of the CPC in those cases where the provisions of the CPC apply. There is, however, no provision in the UPZA and LR Act or the rules framed thereunder nor is there any provision in the CPC prohibiting the passing of more than one preliminary decree in a partition suit. The court has jurisdiction to deal with the rights of the parties and determine their shares in the property involved in the suit, if the circumstances so re