1965 Supreme(All) 343
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
B. DAYAL, D.D. SETH, JJ.
Ram Narain - Appellant
Versus
Kanhaiya Lal Vishwakarma & Anr. - Respondent
Civil Revision No. 844 of 1961
Decided On : 27-08-1965
JUDGMENT
B. Dayal, J. - This is a revision u/s 115 CPC against a judgment of the Addl. District Judge hearing a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The case was originally listed before a learned single Judge of this Court but it has been referred to the Division Bench as a question of law was raised that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the revision. The whole case having been referred to this Bench, we will therefore dispose off the revision itself.
2. On the question of law, the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant is that the District Judge was empowered under the amended Section 25 of the Act to hear revisions. Power, has not been given to the Additional District Judge and u/s 40 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, it is provided by Sub-section (2) that other sections of this Act do not apply to these Courts. We are unable to agree. This Sub-section only means that Section 15, 32, 35, 38 and 39 which have been applied to the Provincial Small Cause Courts by Sub-section (1) are the only sections which are applicable, to cases when being tried by Courts of Small Causes. This section has nothing to do with the decision of cases by courts other than the Courts of Small Causes and on the basis of this section, therefore, it cannot be contended that the Additional District Judge has no power to hear revisions which the District Judge may transfer for decision to him. u/s 8 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, whenever business pending before the District Judge requires aid of Additional District Judges, such Additional Judges can be appointed and they are empowered to discharge any of the functions of the District Judge which the District Judge may assign to them Thus there is no restriction upon the powers of the District Judge assigning any work to the Addl. District Judge arid the Additional District Judge is appointed for the purpose of relieving the Distt. Judge of pressure in work with all the powers of the District Judge. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Addl. District Judge can decide a revision u/s 25 of the Act, if transferred for decision to him by the District Judge. We do not agree with the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant.
3. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant was that, in any case, the Addl. District Judge could not have interfered with the findings of fact arrived at by the court of Small Causes and could not dismiss the suit upon the ground that the endorsement of payment on the back of the promissory-note dated the 23rd of September, 1955 was not made on that date but had been made on the 23rd of April, 1955 and the suit was, therefore, barred by limitation. In order to appreciate this contention, it, may be noted that in paragraph 2 of the plaint, the Plaintiff clearly stated that the Defendant had paid a sum of Rs. 100/- on the 23rd of September, 1955 and thus the limitation was extended and the suit was within time. In paragraph 5 thereof, it was again stated that the cause of action arose on the 22nd of April, 1955 when the promote was executed and again on the 23rd of September, 1955 when Rs. 100/-was paid. In the written statement by both the Defendants, who filed separate written statements, no plea was taken that the suit was barred by limitation. Paragraph 2 was denied subject to the additional pleas in the written statement from which correct facts were to appear, in the additional pleas, it was nowhere mentioned that the endorsement appearing on the back of the promissory note was not made on the date mentioned in the plaint. No issue was also framed on the question of limitation and the only point: for consideration before the Small Cause Court was whether this sum of Rs. 100/- was, in fact, paid or a larger amount was paid, as alleged by the Defendants, on different dates. On the evidence adduced by the par