JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal by a Hindu son-from a decree parsed in execution against him. His father had made a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff-decree-holder and a suit was instituted against him, impleading his minor son. On behalf of The Son at was pleaded that the debt was tainted with immorality and, therefore, the mortgage was bad and the son was not liable to pay the debt. The Court found that the debt was proved to have been, tainted with immorality and therefore declined to pass a decree for sale on the basis of the mortgage-deed but simply passed a money-decree against the father personally. The decree-holder put the decree for money against the father in execution and attached the whole of the ancestral property including that which had been mortgaged. The Court below has allowed the objection of the son so far sis the attachment of his interest in the property is concerned but has ordered execution against the interest of the father in the joint property. The son appeals to this Court and on his behalf it is contended in the First place that the effect of the previous decision was to make the entire family property free from all liability; and in the next place it is contended that in the face of the finding that the debt was tainted with in motility it is not open to the decree-holder to attach any portion of the joint ancestral property. We think that there is; absolutely no substance in the first contention, All that the Court held was that in view of the finding on the question of immorality the mortgage was bad and, therefore, there had been no transfer of the property and no charge created. It passed a simple money decree against the father, but it did not, in any other way, hold that any ancestral property would never be liable to be sold in execution of the decree against the father.

2. The next contention also has no force. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Dcendyal Lai v. Jugdeep Narain Singh 3 C. 198 : 11. A. 247 : 1 C.L.R. 49 : 3 Sar. P.C.J 730 : 3 Suth. P.C.J. 468 : 1 Ind Jur. 604 : 1 Ind Dec 715. that the right, title and interest of one co-sharer in a joint ancestral estate might be attached and sold in execution to satisfy a decree against him personally under the Law of Mitakshara. This principle was re-affirmed by their Lordships in the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Perahad Singh 5 C. 148. 6 I.A. 88 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 1 : 3 Suth P.C.J. 583 : 4 C.L.R. 226 : 2 S.L.R. 242 : 2 Ind. Dec. 715 where at page 174 their Lordships observed that the previous decision had recognized the seizable character of an undivided share in a joint property. This case has been followed by this Court in the case of Lachmi Narain v. Kunji Lai 16 A 449 : (1994) A.W.N. 169 : 8 Lid. Dec. 292. arid in the case of Chandra Sen v. Ganga Ram 2 A. 899 : 1 Ind. Dec. 1165. It seems to us that if the interest of the father alone can be seized in execution of a decree against him the question of the immorality of the debt does not arise. The son is not called upon to pay this debt nor is his property said to be attached and sold. He is entitled to get his interest in the joint property exempted. But it does not-follow that he is also entitled to prevent the attachment and sale of the interest of his father against whom a decree is in force. In the Full Bench case of Karan Singh v. Bhup Singh 27 A. 16 : 1 A.L.J. 310 : (1904) A.W.N. 151 reference was made to an earlier Privy Council case and it was pointed out that if the son sought to escape from having his interest affected by the sale he had to establish that the debt he desired to be exempted from paying was of such a character that he as a Hindu son could not be under the pious obligation to discharge it. In a recent case of Abdul Karim Vs. Ram Kishore and Others . the above mentioned Full Bench case was followed.

3. It is lastly contended that the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad