JUDGMENT

Sulaiman, J. - This is an appeal from an order of remand passed by the District Judge in an appeal frsom a Revenue Court. A preliminary objection has been taken that no appeal lies. This objection is well-founded. u/s 175 of the Agra Tenancy Act no appeal from any decree or order passed by any Court under that Act lies except as therein provided. u/s 177 an appeal is provided from a decree of a District Judge passed on appeal but no appeal is provided from an order passed by a District Judge. It is, therefore, apparent that no appeal from his order of remand, which, of course, is not a decree lies to this Court. This view is concluded by the decision of the Full Bench case of Zohra v. Mangu Lal 28 A. 753 : 3 A.L.J. 569 : (1906) A.W.N. 223 which has been followed recently in the case of Gulzari Lal v. Latif Husain 35 Ind. Cas. 27 : 38 A. 181 : 14 A.L.J. 84.

2. The learned Vakil for the appellant, however, contends that an appeal lies under para. 11 of the Letters Patent of this Court. In our opinion no such appeal lies under that paragraph at all. Under that paragraph, this High Court is constituted a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts and has power to exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as arc subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of any laws or regulations now in force. The constitution of this High Court as a Court of appeal is quite a different thing from saying that this Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from every decree or order passed by a subordinate Court. If, therefore, there is no law or regulation which allows an appeal to it the High Court cannot assume an appellate jurisdiction. The power of revision and superintendence, however, is much wider.

3. The learned Vakil for the appellant next urged that his appeal should be treated as a revision and that inasmuch as the learned District Judge has assumed jurisdiction which was not vested in him, this Court should interfere in revision. This argument is based on the assumption that no appeal lay to the District Judge because no question of proprietary title had been raised in the first Court and no question of jurisdiction had been decided by it. The reply of the learned Advocate for the respondent is that the High Court has no power of revision in a revenue matter at all. The question whether the High Court has power to interfere in revision has been considered in a number of cases which are by no means unanimous and so far there is no Full Bench decision on this matter. The position is as follows:

In at least three cases Ahmad Ullah Khan v. Murli 5 A.L.J. 128 : (1908) A.W.N. 69 Kesho Das v. Morat Pandey 23 Ind. Cas. 320 : 12 A.L.J. 367 and Lalta Prasad v. Kharga 71 Ind. Cas. 773 : 21 A.L.J. 189 : AIR (1923) (A) 313 : 45 A. 336 an application for revision was entertained. Then again in the case of Parbhu Narain Singh v. Harbans Lal 35 Ind. Cas. 279 : 14 A.L.J. 281 at least one Judge expressed the view that a revision may lie from an order passed by a Judge on appeal. On the other hand, the other learned Judge in the case last mentioned, as well as other learned Judges in the case reported as Mohammad Ehtisham Ali v. Lalji Singh 49 Ind. Cas. 362 : 17 A.L.J. 123 : 41 A. 226 and Gaj Kumar Chander v. Salamat Ali 52 Ind. Cas. 756 : 17 A.L.J. 1057 : 1 U.P.L.R. (A.) 142 : 42 A. 83 have expressly laid down that the High Court has no revisional jurisdiction in cases under the Tenancy Act.

4. If there were no direct authority in point, I would have no hesitation in saying that there is no provision in the Tenancy Act which bars the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In the first place, u/s 193 of the Act, the provisions of the C.P.C., with the exception of certain provisions mentioned therein, are made applicable so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act. Section 115 of the C.P. C. corresponding to the old Section 622 is not excluded. Prima facie, therefore, the re-visional section of the C.P.C. is made applicable to suits and p