JUDGMENT

Piggott, J. - This matter Las been laid before me as Taxing Judge, in order that I may pronounce an opinion as to the amount of Court-fee legally payable by the plaintiffs in the Court of first instance, as also on their memorandum of appeal to the lower Appellate Court and in second appeal to this Court. There is a certain ambiguity about the wording of the plaint, although not, in my opinion, a material one. The suit was one by reversionary to the estate of a deceased Hindu against his widow in possession of the same. The relief sought is in the following words:

It may be held that the plaintiffs have a right and a perpetual injunction may be issued by the Court to the defendant restraining her, etc.

2. If stress be laid on the fact that the words are it may be held, and not it may be declared, then this is a suit to obtain an injunction, classified in Section 7 of Court-Fees Act (No. VII of 1870) under Clause 4(d). On the other hand, in stating the valuation of the suit, the plaintiffs used the following language:

For purposes of jurisdiction the suit is valued at Rs. 3,038-7-0 and a Court-fee of Rs. 10 is paid. The relief for issue of injunction is valued at Rs. 10 and a Court-fee of 12 annas is paid on it.

3. If stress be laid on the wording of the above paragraph, then it must be held that the plaintiffs themselves have treated the suit as one for a declaratory decree in which consequential relief is also prayed. In that case suit must be classified under Clause 4(c) of Section 7 aforesaid. In either event, the Court-fee payable must be is computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. In arguing the case for the appellants Dr. Agarwala started with the assumption that, in so far as the suit was one for a declaration, it was subject to a fixed fee of Es. 10 under Article 17 of the second Schedule to the Court-Fees Act (No. VII of 1870). He then took up the relief sought by way of injunction as if it had been claimed in a separate suit and contended that the plaintiffs had a perfect right to value this particular relief as they pleased, and, further, that in the present instance it was not unreasonable for the plaintiffs to put the value of this relief by way of injunction as low as Rs. 10. He referred in argument to Clause 6 of Article 17 in the Schedule aforesaid. This provides a fixed fee of Rs. 10 for every other suit where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute which is not otherwise provided for by this Act, This is the fundamental fallacy in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants. Whichever way the plaint of this suit be looked at, it is one otherwise proved for by the Act. It is either a suit to obtain an injunction, or it is a suit to obtain a declaratory decree in which consequential relief is prayed. The argument for the appellants is so far correct that the plaintiffs in such a suit are entitled to state the value to them of the relief claimed and the Court-fee payable must be calculated according to the amount at which the relief sought is thus valued. These provisions, however, must be read subject to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act (No. VII of 1837). What the plaintiffs in a suit like the present are not entitled to do is to put a high valuation on the plaint for purposes of jurisdiction, and thus obtain an adjudication on the matter from a Court of superior grade, while, at the same time, asking for a different and much lower valuation for the purposes of Court-fees. This is precisely the point which was considered by a Bench of this Court in the case of Jageshra v. Durga Prasad Singh 24 Ind. Cas. 679 : 12 A.L.J. 844 : 36 A. 500. It is quite true, as was contended, by Counsel for one of the parties in the above case, that the intention of the Legislature is that parties should first value their suits for purposes of Court-fees and, when this has been done, the valuation for purposes of Court-fee will, in a