JUDGMENT

J.N. Takru, J. - This revision by the tenant is directed against the order of the learned Munsif Nagina, dated the 13th August, 1966, dismissing his application under Section 7C of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act - hereinafter called the Act.

2. The application giving rise to this revision was filed on the allegations that the applicant was the tenant of the accommodation mentioned in his application on a monthly rental of Rs. 2.25. He tendered the rent of the said accommodation for the period 1.2.1961 to 2.4.1966 to the opposite-party who was its landlord, both personally and by money order, but he refused to accept the same. Hence the application under Section 7C of the Act.

3. On the aforesaid application being filed, the learned Munsif issued notice to the opposite party. The opposite party filed objections denying the allegations of the applicant that he tendered the rent to him (the opposite party) either personally or by money order. He further alleged that as the accommodation in question had ceased to be 'accommodation' under the Act, inasmuch as its roof had been burnt and its walls had fallen down, the provisions of Section 7C of the Act did not apply to it. The learned Munsif accepted the legal objection of the opposite party and dismissed the application, thus giving rise to the present revision.

4. On behalf of the applicant his learned counsel Shri R.P. Singh, strenuously challenged the finding of the learned Munsif on two grounds. His first contention was that as there was no legally admissible evidence to show that the accommodation in question had ceased to be 'accommodation' the learned Munsif in refusing to deal with his application on merits failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law. His second contention was that even if the opposite party's allegations that the roof of the said accommodation had been burnt and the walls had collapsed were accepted as correct, accommodation would still not cease to be accommodation under the Act and the learned Munsif in refusing to consider the application on merits failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties I am, however, satisfied that neither of these contentions has any force. I shall, therefore, proceed to give my reasons for coming to that conclusion after quoting the relevant portions of Section 7(c). Thus quoted the section reads as follows :-

"7C (1) When a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by the tenant in respect of any accommodation the tenants may in the prescribed manner deposit such rent and continue to deposit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such accommodation unless the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it.................."

A plain reading of the aforesaid section shows that the rent which the tenant seeks to deposit under it must be rent in respect of an accommodation as defined in the Act. In other words if no accommodation under the Act exists on the date on which the application is made under Section 7C the provisions of that section would have no application to such a case. We have, therefore, to turn to the definition of the word 'accommodation' to see whether on the date on which the application was made the accommodation in question was accommodation under the Act or not ? "Accommodation" under Section 2(a), in so far as it is material for the present purposes, means residential or non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building, and includes gardens, grounds and out-houses if any appurtenant to such a building or part of the building. Thus according to this definition the basic concept, underlying the word accommodation is that it should be an accommodation in a building or part of a building which can be put to residential or non-residential use. In my judgment the use of the preposition 'in' in connection with t