JUDGMENT

M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a defendants second appeal against a decree for possession and recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits in which several important questions of law have arisen for consideration. The suit was decreed by the Courts below and hence this second appeal.

2. The plaintiffs filed the suit with the allegations that one Lala Harbands Lal since dead was the owner of the land detailed at the foot of the plaint, that he let out the land to Mistri Ibrahim on 7.1.1944 on a monthly rent of Rs. 12/- which was later enhanced to Rs. 24/- with effect from 1.2.1948, that in the end of the year 1949 or the beginning of 1950 the defendant colluded with the said tenant mistri Ibrahim and entered in possession of the suit land that later Mistri Ibrahim left the land and Lala Harbans Lal recognised the defendant as his tenant on the same terms and conditions, that Lala Harbans Lal died in November, 1954 and as he had left a will and created a trust the suit was brought by his heirs. The plaintiffs alleged further to have served the defendant with a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 9.7.1959 but in spite of the expiry of the period of notice the defendant did not vacate the land and hence the suit was brought for recovery of possession of the said land. The plaintiffs also claimed Rs. 775/- as arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 12/- per month; Rs. 27/- as mesne profits and further manse profit at the rate of Rs. 1/- per day.

3. The defence to the suit was that when the landlord was let out to the defendant it had a roofed verandah and a Kothri that the rate of rent was Rs. 12/- per month and the same had been paid to and accepted by Lala Harbans Lal and his successor. Mistri Ibrahim was said to have his workshop on the disputed site and also he instated some machines. In 1949 the appellant claimed to have acquired the goodwill, workshop and business of Mustri Ibrahim with the consent and permission of Lala Harbans Lal and constructed permanent buildings by investing a sum of Rs. 40,000/- within the knowledge and with the consent of Lala Harbans Lal and as such he and his successors were estopped from ejecting the defendant. An objection was also raised as to the insufficiency of the Court fees and the suit not being cognizable by the Court of the Munsif. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred by Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1949. The notice was said to be invalid as the tenancy could not be terminated by a notice of 30 days duration.

4. The first point which was raised before me on behalf of the appellant was that the suit had not been properly valued and on proper valuation the trial Court would not have the jurisdiction to try the same. It was contended that since the relief of vacant possession was asked for in the plaint and the defence was that there were structures existing and a decree had in fact been passed by the trial Court for possession after demolition of the structures, it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to value the suit after taking into consideration the structures worth about Rs. 40,000/- which were alleged to have been made by the appellant. In this view of the matter according to the appellant the jurisdiction on the learned Munsif would have been clearly ousted. The learned counsel relied on the provisions of Section 4 of the suits Valuation Act and submitted that the suit for possession should be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at the market value of the property involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought in the plaint. It was contended that demolition of the property in the shape of structures existing on the land and consequently the same must be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction. The learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Shanti Prasad v. Mahabir Singh, AIR 1957 Allahabad 402 : A.L.J. 431 for the proposition that a suit had to be valued for two purposes; firstly for payment, of court f