JUDGMENT

V.G. Oak, J. - The short point for consideration in this Second Appeal is whether the suit instituted by the appellant is within time or not. Shafqat Husain appellant was an employee of the Municipal Board of Sambhal (district Moradabad). On 22-12-1958 the President of the Municipal Board passed an order dismissing the appellant from service. Against that order the plaintiff filed a departmental appeal. That departmental appeal was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority. The order was communicated to the plaintiff on 28-6-1960. On 2-1-1961 Shafqat Husain filed the suit, which has given rise to this Second Appeal. The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the order of dismissal dated 22-12-1958 was illegal and void, and the plaintiff was still in the service of the defendant-Municipal Board. The plaintiff's claim was resisted by the Municipal Board, Sambhal. One of the pleas raised in defence was that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court took up that question as a preliminary issue. The Court upheld the defendant's plea that the suit was barred by time. The suit was, therefore, dismissed. An appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge, Moradabad. Shafqat Husain plaintiff has come to this Court in Second Appeal.

2. Limitation for such suits has been prescribed by sub-Sec. (3) of Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereafter referred to as the Act). Section 326. (3) states:

"No action stich as is described in sub-Sec. (1) shall ...... be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action."

3. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 326 of the Act prescribes for a notice to be given to a Municipal Board before filing a suit against it. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the period of limitation is extended by two months as a consequence of the provision of sub-Sec. (1) of Section 326. The combined effect of sub-Sec. (1) and sub Sec. (3) of Section 326 is that the aggrieved party may file a suit within eight months after the accrual of the cause of action. The parties are, however, not agreed as regards the date of accrual of the cause of action. The plaintiff's case is that the cause of action arose on 28-6-1960, when the order dismissing the departmental 'appeal was communicated to the plaintiff. The defendant's case is that the cause of action accrued on 22-12-1958, when the impugned order of dismissal was passed.

4. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur, 1959 A.L.J. 106. It was held in Sita Ram's case', that the aggrieved Municipal employee may either file an appeal or he may straight away challenge the validity of the resolution on any ground available to him in law. There is nothing in provisions of Section 58 to prevent him from doing so, and if without exercising his right of appeal which is given to him by the statute he filed a suit in the Civil Court to establish the ultra vires or the illegal character of such a resolution it could not be urged that such a suit was premature, he not having exhausted the remedies given to him under the statute.

5. There is nothing in provision of Section 58 which expressly or impliedly bars his right of suit. The mere filing of an appeal has not the effect of holding the order of the Board in abeyance or postponing the effect thereof until the decision of the appeal.

6. Sita Ram's case' Was decided by the Supreme Court on 19-8-1958. If the law is today the same as in August 1958, it is clear that the two lower courts are right in dismissing the plaintiff's claim on the ground of limitation. But Mr. K. C. Agrawal, appearing for the appellant, urged that the law has been altered after August 1958.

7. The appellant relies upon certain regulations framed by the State Government in January 1959. Those regulations were published in Part III of the the P. Gazette, dated 31-1-1959. Regulation No. 22 is in these terms:

"No