1967 Supreme(All) 458
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
V.G. OAK, J.
Prem Wati - Appellant
Versus
Gurudwara Budaun - Respondent
S. A. No. 1506 of 1961. (Second Appeal against the judgment and decree of H.C. Srivastava, Civil Judge Budaun, dated 10.31961 in Civil Appeal No. 168 of 1958.).
Decided On : 31-01-1967
A.P.S. Chauhan, Advocate, For the Appellant / P.M. Verma, Advocate, For the Respondent
JUDGMENT
V.G. Oak, J. - This second appeal by a defendant arises out of a suit for possession. Gurudwara, Bulaun through S. N. Jab brought the suit against Smt. Prem Wati on the following allegations.
2. The plaintiff purchased certain property from the defendant. There was litigation between the parties. The plaintiff brought against the defendant suit No. 11 of 1942. That suit was compromised. According to the compromise decree, the house now in dispute was declared to be the property of the plaintiff. The defendant was permitted to occupy the house for her residence. Later she was asked to quit. She did not leave the house. The plaintiff, therefore brought the suit for her ejectment in the year 1955.
3. The plaintiffs claim was resisted by the defendant. One of the points raised in defence was that The plaintiff is not a legal entity, and is not, therefore, capable of suing. That point and other pleas raised in defence were overruled by the Munsif, Budaun, who tried the suit. The Court, therefore, decreed the plaintiff's claim. An appeal by the defendant was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Budaun. Smt. Prem Wati, defendant has come to this Court in second appeal.
4. In this Court also the defendant has reiterated her plea that the plaintiff is not a legal entity, and is not capable of suing. It is pointed out for the appellant that the suit was brought in the name of a Gurudwara. The question, therefore, arises whether a suit brought in the name of a Gurdwara is maintainable.
5. In Jodhi Rai v. Basdeo Prasad, I.L.R. 33 Alld. 735 it was explained by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court that an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property. A suit in the name of an idol has to be filed through the manager of the temple in which the idol is installed.
6. In Bhagwan Koer v. J.C. Bose, I.L.R. 31 Calcutta 11 it was held by the Judicial Committee that a Sikh is a 'Hindu' within the meaning of that term as used in Section 2 of the Probate and Administration Act.
7. In Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Devi, I.L.R. 32 Cal. 129 it was held that in complete dedication an idol is regarded as a juridical person capable of holding property. There are less complete endowments in which, notwithstanding a religious dedication, property descends to heirs subject to a trust or charge. Even in religious dedications of the strictest character the possession and management of dedicated property belongs to the sebait in whom is vested the right to sue.
8. In Sunder Singh v. Sunder Singh, A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 73 suit was brought by the Managing Committee of a certain High School. The defendant raised the plea that the plaintiff Managing Committee had no locus standi to maintain the suit. That plea was over-ruled by the Court. It was held that the suit was maintainable. The reason was that the society was a registered body.
9. In S.V. Daniels v. G.W. Friendly Trust, A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 579 there were two trustees of a certain trust. The suit was brought by one of the two trustees. It was held that it was not open to one trustee only to maintain the suit. The defect was of a formal nature. The omission to implead the other trustee amounted to a mere irregularity. That defect could be allowed to be removed at any stage.
10. In Satnam Singh v. Bawan Bliagwan, A.I.R. 1935 Alld. 198 it was held that a Mahant is in the position of a trustee of the Math property. Property appertaining to the Math vests not in the Mahant personally, but in the institution. The property remains throughout the property of the institution.
11. In Shahid Ganj v. S.G.P. Committee, A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 116 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed on page 122:
"Their Lordships .... must not be taken as deciding that a 'juristic personality' may be extended for any purpose to Muslim institutions generally or to mosques in particular. On this general question they reserve their opinion; but they think it right to decide the specific question which arises in the present cas