JUDGMENT

Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - The question involved in this appeal is one of limitation.

2. The facts which are no longer in dispute are that between 25-6-1951 and 16-4-1952 the plaintiff supplied to the defendant various consignments of bricks required by the latter for the construction of his house. The total price of the bricks supplied was Rs. 3,002/2/- and the payments made by the defendant from time to time amounted to Rs. 1,370/-.

3. These payments included a sum of Rs. 100/- paid by the defendant on 24-12-1953 by means of a cheque. The plaintiff filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal for the recovery of Rs. 1,793/2/. due to him as balance of price including interest thereon. The suit was filed on 22-12-1956 and it was claimed by the plaintiff that limitation was saved on account of the above payment of Rs. 100/-. The defendant contested the claim. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by time but on appeal the lower appellate court held the suit to be within time and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the amount sued for. The defendant has come up in appeal to this Court. The only point in controversy now is whether the payment of Rs. 100/- extended limitation for recovery of the price due in respect of the consignments.

4. In their arguments before me the learned counsel for the parties agreed that the suit is governed by Article 52 of the Limitation Act, but they differed about what should be regarded as the starting point of limitation in the circumstances of the case. On behalf of the plaintiff it was urged that the supplies made by him were parts of a single continuous transaction of sale which was completed when the last consignment was delivered to the defendant on 16-4-1952, and that date should be taken as the date of the delivery of the goods within the meaning of Article 52 of the Limitation Act. The contention for the defendant, on the other hand, was that the delivery of each consignment constituted a separate sale, and limitation for the recovery of the price of each consignment started as soon as that particular consignment was delivered. Since the suit was filed beyond three years from the delivery of even the last consignment, the question of the commencement of the period of limitation may at first sight seem to be of little significance because the case should turn only on the efficacy of the payment for the purpose of giving a fresh start of limitation. But, as will appear later, the question assumes importance also in deciding whether the payment could in fact give a fresh start of limitation.

5. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he placed with the defendant an order for a specific quantity of bricks and that it was agreed between him and the defendant that price would become payable after the entire quantity has been delivered. If that had been the nature of the transaction, no delivery could have made price payable or constituted delivery of the goods within the meaning of Article 52 of the Limitation Act unless, by itself or along with preceding deliveries, it had the effect of completing the execution of the order. It may be that the defendant intended to purchase from the plaintiff the entire quantity of bricks which he might need for the construction of his house and the plaintiff too intended to supply it; but that by itself could not make the various deliveries parts of one continuous whole. There may have been a continuity in the deliveries in the sense that there was a series of dealings between the parties covering a number of deliveries; but the deliveries could not merely on that account form parts of one whole, and each of them remained separate and distinct. The result was that the price of each consignment delivered to the defendant became payable at once. Under Sec. 32 of the Sale of Goods Act delivery of goods and payment of price are, unless otherwise agreed, concurrent conditions and no contrary agreement, either express or implied, existe