JUDGMENT

V. Bhargava , J. - This special appeal is directed against an order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the petitioner who has challenged the validity of the appointment of respondent No. 4 as Secretary of the District Board of Basti and his continued employment at present by the Zila Parishad of Basti. The ground for challenge was that respondent No. was appointed during the term of a district board of which a relation of respondent No. had been a member. It appears that one Shri Kailash Shankar a relation of respondent No. was a member of the Board upto November, 1955, and he submitted his resignation from membership on 6th November 1955. On 20th December, 1955, his resignation was accepted. The actual appointment of respondent No. 4 as Secretary of the District Board was made on 19th August, 1956. Even upto the date of appointment of respondent No. 4 the same District Board was still functioning without re-elections, so that the term of the District Board, of which Shri Kailash Shanker had been a member, was still continuing. The point raised was that, under Rule 1 of the rules prescribing qualifications and scales of pay of District Board Secretaries, this appointment was invalid. The relevant clause relied upon reads as follows:-

"1. No person shall be appointed as Secretary of a district board unless-

(e) neither he nor any of his relations has been a member of the board in whose term the appointment takes place."

2. On this language, the submission on behalf of the appellant was that the expression "in whose terms" should be read as qualifying the word "board" and, in the present case, respondent No. 4 having been appointed during the term of the board of which his relation had been a member even though afterwards he had ceased to be one the appointment was invalid and contrary to this rule. The learned Single Judge saw some force in this submission and, consequently proceeded to decide the case against the appellant on a different ground. To us it appears that this ground, which has been urged on behalf of the appellant, has no force and that the appointment of respondent No. 4 was not contrary to this rule.

3. We are of this view as, in our opinion, the expression "in whose term" should be held to qualify the whole of the expression "member of the board" and not merely the word "board". In other words, the expression "in whose term" is an adjectival clause qualifying the word "member" and not the not the word "board". We consider that this would be the proper interpretation on both considerations, viz., the object of the rule as well as the language used in it.

4. So far as the question of object is concerned, it seems to us that the appointment of any person as a servant would bee justifiably barred while a relation of his is a member of the board and while, in that capacity, he can use his influence in the Board in order to obtain the appointment. Once the relation ceases to be a member of the board, there can be no such fear of undue influence being used by the relation in order to obtain the appointment. Then there is another circumstance that has to be kept in view which brings out an anomaly. Supposing some one is appointed a servant of the board, and and subsequently, in a bye-election during the term of the same board, a relation of that person happens to be elected as a member and becomes a member. Will it mean that the appointment already made will thereafter be deemed to have been in contravention of this rule? Thus, considering the purpose of this rule, we think that the correct interpretation of the rule is that the determining factor is the term of the member and not the term of the board and an appointment is bared only when it is made during the term of the member who is the relation of the person being appointed.

5. Next we take up the consideration of the language used in this rule. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that, in the District Boards Act,