JUDGMENT

V.G. Oak, J. - This is a second appeal by a defendant arising out of a suit for declaration and recovery of arrears of salary. Sheo Prasad Bajpai was an employee of the Municipal Board of Kanpur. He was suspended on 25-4-1953. On 9-7-1953 the President of the Municipal Board passed an order terminating the services of Sheo Prasad. That order was communicated to him on 26-7-1953. Sheo Prasad filed an appeal to. the State Government. The State Government declined to interfere in the matter on the ground that the appeal was incompetent. That order was communicated to Sheo Prasad on 14-5-1954. Sheo Prasad, therefore, filed the civil suit on 23-12-1954 for a declaration that the order dated 9-7-1953 was null and void and inoperative. He claimed a sum of Rs. 1,794/12/6 as arrears of his salary from 25-4-1953 to 23.12.1954.

2. The plaintiff's claim was opposed by both the defendants (the Municipal Board of Kanpur and the State Government). It was denied that the order dated 9-7-1953 was inoperative or illegal. I t was also pleaded in defence that the plaintiff's claim was barred by time. On both the points, the trial court found in plaintiff's favour. The court, therefore, passed in plaintiff's favour a decree for declaration and arrears of salary. An appeal filed by the Municipal Board of Kanpur was dis missed by the lst Additional District Judge of Kanpur. The Municipal Board (now Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur) has, therefore, come to this Court in second appeal.

3. The trial court noticed that the State Government did not dispose I of Sheo Prasad's departmental appeal on merits. On this point, the learned Munsif observed :

"The State Government's refusal to entertain the plaintiff's said appeal amounted to refusal of an adequate opportunity of defence to the plaintiff. Therefore, in my opinion e order of the Chairman of the defendant No. 1 ...... is void illegal."

4. It is not easy to follow this reasoning. Assuming that the State Government was wrong in taking he view that the departmental appeal was incompetent, it does not follow that the order passed by the President of the Municipal Board as void or illegal. The trial court ad to decide that point for itself on Brits of the case.

5. The main point raised in the second appeal relates to limitation. The defendant relied upon Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, hereafter referred to as the Act. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 326 states:

"No suit shall be instituted against a board or against a member, officer or servant of a board, in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a board, left at its office ....."

Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 326 states:-

"No action such as is described in sub-Sec. (1) shall unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for declaration of title thereto be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action."

6. The combined effect of sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 326 is that, a suit for declaration and arrears of salary had to be filed within eight months of the accrual of the cause of action. Parties are not agreed as regards the starting point for limitation. According to the plaintiff-respondent, the starting point for limitation was 14-5-1954-the date on which the order of the State Government dismissing the appeal was communicated to the plaintiff. According to the defendant-appellant, the starting point for limitation was 26-7-1953 the date on which the order terminating the plaintiff's services was communicated to the plaintiff.

7. Mr. S. N. Verma appearing for the appellant relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur, 1957 A.L.J. 768 In that case it was held that a complete cause of action is furnished by resolution of dismissal passed by the Municipal Board under Section 58 of the Mun