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1968 Supreme(All) 278

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
R. B. MISRA, J.
Ranjit Singh - Appellant
Versus
Nirbhayanand - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 3382 of 1966 dated 1-10-1966 passed by the III Additional Civil Judge, Agra (Sri M. L. Gupta) in Civil Appeal No. 254 of 1966, arising out of original suit No. 833 of 1964.
Decided On : 21-11-1968

Advocates appeared:
G. D. Srivastava, Advocate, for the Defendant-Appellants; Hari Swaroop, Advocate, For the Respondent

JUDGMENT

R. B. Misra, J. - This is a defendants' appeal against the decision of the 'Third Additional Civil Judge, Agra, dated 1-7-1966. The respondent, Sri Nirbhayanand, is the owner of a shop bearing Cantonment No. 29, Pratabpuri, Agra. Ranjit Singh, the first appellant, is the tenant in the said shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- Appellants Nos. 2 to 4 are the own brothers of the first appellant, and they carry on business in the shop in the name and style of appellant No. 5. i.e. Messrs Ranjit Brothers, on behalf of the first appellant. Appellants Nos. 2 to 4 are, of course, in occupation of the shop at the instance and on behalf of the first appellant. The respondent wanted to evict Ranjit Singh from the shop. and for that purpose he obtained permission under Section 14 of the U. P. (Cantonment) Control of Rent and Eviction Act to institute a suit for ejectment of the first appellant. on the basis of the said permission, the respondent filed a suit (No. 800 of 1961) in the Court of the Munsif, Agra for recovery of arrears of rent and also for ejectment of the tenant-the first respondent Ranjit Singh. The suit was decreed for arrears of rent, but was dismissed for ejectment on the ground that service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been proved. The respondent, thereupon, filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal.

2. In the plaint the respondent clearly alleged that Ranjit Singh, the first appellant, alone was the tenant of the shop in question, and appellants, Nos. 2 to 4 were his real brothers; that the shop was in occupation of his brothers-appellants is Nos. 2 to 4-who carried on business in the name and style of appellant No. 5 at the instance of the first appellant, who is serving as guard in the Western Railway. His tenancy had been determined by a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

3. The suit was contested by the appellants on grounds, inter alia, that they were joint tenants of the shop, and that the permission to sue was invalid. It was further alleged that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served on him.

4. The trial court held that the appellants were not joint tenants of the shop; that appellant No. 1 alone was the tenant of the shop; that the permission obtained under Section 14 of U. P. (Cantonment) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was a valid one; and that the notice to quit was served on the tenant. On these findings the suit for ejectment was decreed. The defendants went up in appeal, and the Civil judge confirmed the findings recorded by the trial court. They have now come to this Court in Second Appeal.

5. The Advocate-General, appearing for the appellants, raised only one contention before me. He challenged the finding of the learned judge on the issue of service of notice under Sec. 10 & of the Transfer of Property Act on the first appellant. Essentially this finding is a pure finding of fact and cannot normally be challenged in Second Appeal. The Advocate-General, however, attacked the said finding on the following grounds: Firstly, because the learned Judge has not correctly appreciated the various modes of service of notices provided by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; and, secondly, because the finding is based either on surmises and conjectures or on consideration of irrelevant evidence.

6. In order to appreciate the first part of his argument it will be pertinent to examine Section 106 of the said Act, which reads thus :

"In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or l

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