JUDGMENT

R.L. Gulati, J. - This is an appeal against the judgement of a learned Single Judge of this Court passed in a writ petition in which the levy of Circumstances and Property Tax had been challenged by the appellants.

2. The appellants are partners of a firm which carries on business in the firm name of M/s. Satyanarain Jalan in the town area Robertsganj, previously the firm itself used to be assessed to Circumstances and Property Tax, but in the year 1965-66 the partners were assessed individually. They appealed, against the assessments to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Robertsganj. The appeals were dismissed. They then preferred revision petition before the District Magistrate, Mirzapur. The District Magistrate dismissed the revision lay against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The appellants then preferred a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging Magistrate dismissing the appeal and the District Magistrate dismissing the revision.

3. It was urged before the learned Single Judge that the District Magistrate was wrong in holding that no revision lay against the appellate order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The argument was that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate decided the appeals under the powers delegated to him by the District Magistrate under Section 4 of the Town Areas Act and the District Magistrate could revise the appellate order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under the proviso to Section 4 which authorises the District Magistrate to revise any order passed by an officer under the delegated powers.

4. The power of the District Magistrate as an appellate authority and the extent to which such power can be delegated is contained in Section 18 of the Town Areas Act. Sub-sec. (1) whereof provides that an appeal against the levy of the Town Area shall be to the District Magistrate or to such Magistrate as he may appoint in this behalf. It is clear that the delegation of the appellate power of the District Magistrate is governed by Section 18 and not by Section 4 which is a general section. Under Section 18 the District Magistrate can delegate his appellate powers only to such Magistrate as he may appoint in this behalf. Sub-sec. (4) of Section 18 provides that the decision of the appeal shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court. This makes it very clear that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed in appeal was not open to revision by the District Magistrate. This contention was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge.

5. Sri V. K. S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellants, then contended that the levy of tax on the appellants was without jurisdiction. According to him, the firm alone could be taxed and the partners could not be assessed in respect of their share in the firm.

6. We find no merit in this contention. The Town Area Act by virtue of Section 14 (1) (f) seeks to levy "a tax on persons assessed according to their circumstances and property not exceeding such rate and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed." Under Rule 3 of the Rules framed under Section 39 (2) of the Act, tax is levied upon a person, who resides or carries on business within the limits of the town area. It is well settled that a partnership firm is not a person-natural or legal, for purposes of the partnership Act. It is only a compendious name for the partners who agree to share the profits of a business carried on by them all or any one of them acting for all. The definition of the word "person" in the General Clauses Act also cannot be imported because it is repugnant to the partnership Act. This proposition has been settled by the Supreme Court in Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 354 in paragraph 16 whereof. Their Lordships expressed the view that the definition of `person' as given in the General Clauses Act was repugnant to the law of partnership and proceeded to observe:

"In our opinio