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1958 Supreme(All) 270

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
M.C. DESAI, J.
Raja Ram - Appellant
Versus
State Through Bhikkan - Respondent
Cr. Rev. No. 1393 of 1956 (Criminal Revision against the order of R.R. Kaushik, Civil and Sessions Judge of Meerut dated the 14th June, 1956 in Cr. A. No. 415 of 1955).
Decided On : 06-11-1958

Advocates appeared:
K.B.L. Gaur, Advocate, for the Applicant; T.N. Madan, Advocate, for the Opposite Parties

JUDGMENT

M.C. Desai, J. - This is an application in revision against an order of a Magistrate directing the applicant to pay under Sec. 250, Cr. P. C. compensation of Rs. 501- to each of four persons and in default to undergo imprisonment for 21 days in respect a each default. The applicant had prosecuted four persons for the offence of Sec. 403, I. P. C. on the allegation that they had committed criminal misappropriation in respect of his buffaloes. The defence was that the buffaloes belonged to the accused themselves and not to the applicant. The court accepted the defence, dismissed the complaint and called upon the applicant to show cause why he should not be ordered to pay compensation under Sec. 250. After hearing him it passed the order under revision.

2. The finding of the courts below that the complaint filed by the applicant against the four persons was false is one of fact and supported by evidence which could be believed. An order under Sec. 250 cannot be passed on the mere ground that the complaint was false; it must also be found to have been malicious or vexatious. Both the courts below were convinced that the complaint was vexatious also. The applicant objected to the observation of the appellate court to the effect that "if the complaint filed by the appellant was false then it was certainly vexatious also". This observation was made by it after referring to the case for the prosecution and the case for the defence and must be read not in isolation but in the light of what it said previously. It certainly did not mean to lay down that every false complaint is presumed to be vexatious or that once the complaint is found to be false, no question arises of its being vexatious also. What is meant is that in the present case the complaint could not be false without at the same time being vexatious. The circumstances were such that if the complaint was found to be false it would have to be found to be vexatious as well. The circumstances were so much within the knowledge of the applicant that he could not reasonably plead that the complaint was false but not vexatious. There could be no reason for his making the false complaint other than that he wanted to harass the four accused. I do not see anything illegal or improper in the finding of the courts below that the applicant deserved to be required to pay compensation.

The only other contention raised in this case is that it was illegal on the part of the courts below to award 21 day's imprisonment for nonpayment of compensation in respect of each default. Because there were four persons, it was argued, the total period of imprisonment awarded in default amounted to 84 days against the maximum period of 30 days laid down in Sec. 250 (2-A), which reads as follows:-

"The Magistrate may, by the order directing payment of the compensation under sub-sec. (2) further order that, in default of payment, the person ordered to pay such compensation shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days."

3. Though the provision does not expressly lay down that the maximum of 30 days is in respect of each default it appears to be in respect of each default. Sentences of imprisonment inflicted upon one person may be cumulative, but there cannot possibly arise any question of sentences of imprisonment inflicted upon two or more persons being cumulative for the simple reason that each person will undergo only the sentence inflicted on him and is not affected in any manner by the imprisonment inflicted upon any other person. Imprisonments inflicted upon two or more persons, whether substantively or in default, cannot, therefore, be added up for any purpose. If the words "in respect of each default" are not used in the provision, the words "in the case" also are not used and it cannot be argued that the maximum laid down in the provision is for the aggregate of the periods of imprisonment inflicted in default in the case. There is no justification for interpreting th

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