JUDGMENT

Debi Prasad Uniyal, J. - This revision has been filed from the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Deoria affirming the order of the S.D.M. Padrauna directing the Applicant to appear before him for being examined Under Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. Sri B.P. Bajoria, Applicant and one Ramesh Chandra were prosecuted Under Section 92 of the Factories Act. The offence with which they were charged was tried as a summons case. On 23-3 1964 which was the date fixed for appearance of the accused in court an application was moved on his behalf that his personal attendance be dispensed with and he be permitted to appear through counsel. This was allowed by the Magistrate. Thereafter the prosecution produced its witnesses who were cross-examined by the accused. Before calling upon the accused to enter on their defence the Magistrate ordered the Applicant to appear in court on 13-7-1964 for being examined Under Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. The Applicant contested the legality of the Magistrate's order in revision before the Sessions Judge but the same was rejected. Hence this application in revision before me.

3. The main argument of the learned Counsel was that the Applicant having been exempted from personal appearance the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to insist on his presence in court. He referred to an application made by Sri B.P. Bajoria in the court of S.D.M. Padrauna, in paragraph 9 of which it was stated that his counsel had made a statement Under Section 242 Code of Criminal Procedure on his behalf wherein he had pleaded guilty to the charge and hence there was no necessity of his personal appearance in court for being examined Under Section 342. The statement made by the Applicant's counsel Under Section 242 Code of Criminal Procedure goes to show that he denied the charge that the constructions in question were unauthorised or that requisite permission for the same had not been obtained. The statement added that constructions were according to plan submitted to the factory inspector and that the offence, if any, was a technical one. It is clear that the accused had not pleaded guilty with respect to the offence charged.

4. Another point worthy of notice in this connection is that the accused refuted the statement of the factory inspector that the constructions in question were unauthorised and contravened the provisions of the Factory Act. The accused cross-examined the Factory Inspector and it was suggested that a plan had been sent to him according to law and if there was delay in according sanction it was no fault of the accused. Thus from the statement of the accused Under Section 242 Code of Criminal Procedure and from the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses the only reasonable inference was that the accused had not admitted their guilt. Under the circumstances the presence of the Applicant for purposes of recording his statement Under Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure was very essential and the Magistrate was perfectly right in directing the accused to appear in court on the date fixed. The accused cannot claim immunity from personal attendance in court if the latter considers his presence necessary in the interest of justice.

5. I am clearly of the opinion that the Magistrate acted within the law in ordering personal attendance of the Applicant in court for purposes of recording his statement Under Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure.

6. I see no force in this application in revision. It is accordingly rejected.