JUDGMENT :

1. The present second appeal has been preferred assailing impugned judgment and order dated 16.02.2002 delivered by the court of learned Additional District Judge Xth, Lucknow in Regular Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1993 (Executive Officer, Nagar Palika, Lakhimpur Kheri Vs. M/s Krishna Chemicals) and impugned judgment and order dated 18.9.1993 delivered by the court of learned Civil Judge IVth, Lucknow in Regular Suit No. 231/1985 (M/s Krishna Chemicals Vs. State of U.P. and others).

2. Learned trial court has decreed suit of the plaintiff/respondent for recovery of amount of Rs. 77,936.30/-along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Learned first appellate court has dismissed appeal preferred by the appellant.

3. The present second appeal was admitted vide order dated 23.5.2002 on the following substantial questions of law:-

“1. Whether any invalid or illegal contract may be enforced against the parties concerned?

2. Whether section 97 of Nagar Palika Adhiniyam, (1916) and Section 70 of Indian Contract Act may be ignored while deciding Regular Civil Appeal.

3. Whether time barred Regular Suit may be entertained and decreed.

4. Whether the trial court concerned has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain Regular Civil Suit?”

Principles for entertaining Second Appeal

4. On the point of admission of Second appeal, the following exposition of law is relevant:-

5. In the case of Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa, (2019) 6 SCC 409 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"7.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the impugned judgment and order [Narayanappa v. Rangamma, 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 737] , in a second appeal and in exercise of the powers under Section 100 CPC, the High Court has set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below. The learned trial court dismissed the suit and the same came to be confirmed by the learned first appellate court. While allowing the second appeal, the High Court framed only one substantial question of law which reads as under:

“Whether the appellant is the owner and in possession of the suit land as he purchased it in the year 1973, that is, subsequent to the date 23-4-1971 when Ext. D-1, partition deed, Palupatti is alleged to have come into existence?” No other substantial question of law was framed. We are afraid that the aforesaid can be said to be a substantial question of law at all. It cannot be disputed and even as per the law laid down by this Court in the catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only with the second appeal involving a substantial question of law. The existence of “a substantial question of law” is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.

7.2. As observed and held by this Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722], in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the first appellate court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower court were erroneous being:

(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR

(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court;

OR

(iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence.

It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in the second appeal. It is further observed that the trial court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal.

7.3. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Cour