Point of Law: The concept of any further or other proceeding to resolve the dispute that may be made a subject matter of reference to an arbitral tribunal, is an absolute anathema to the founding principle of arbitration. It is for that reason, that a limited scope of challenge exists against any award of arbitrator/s, under section 34 of the Act.

JUDGMENT :

SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.

1. Heard Sri. Pranjal Mehrotra, learned counsel for the appellant through video conferencing and Sri. Shesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent- claimant who is present in Court. Sri. Gaurav Pundir, learned counsel is also present through video conference on behalf of a brother of respondent no. 1. His impleadment application stands rejected by order dated 25.11.2020. Hence, he was not heard.

2. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 07.03.2020 passed by the District Judge, Mathura in Miscellaneous Arbitration Case No. 35 of 2017, Bhartiya Rashtriya Rajmarg Pradhikaran vs. Rajesh Kaushik and Others. By that order, the learned District Judge, Mathura has rejected the objection filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) as not maintainable. That objection had been filed against the award of the arbitrator dated 25.10.2016, referable to Section 3-G (5) of The National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Highways Act’) arising from the order dated 31.01.2013 passed by the competent authority. Perusal of that order reveals, amongst others, compensation for the 3600 sq. mtrs land, plot no. 332/1M belonging to the respondent had been determined. Being aggrieved, the respondents had invoked arbitration under Section 3-G (5) of the Highways Act. By that award, the learned arbitrator, directed the ‘competent authority’ under the ‘Highways Act’ to re-determine the amount of compensation under Section 3-G (1) of the Highways Act.

3. Sole submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellant is, though there was no defect in the arbitration proceedings thus instituted, however, the learned arbitrator has acted without jurisdiction in remitting the matter to the competent authority to re-determine the amount of compensation. Referring to Section 3-G (7) of the Highways Act and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Writ (C) No. 8347 of 2018 (Rajiv Memorial Academy Welfare Society vs. Union of India and Others, it has been submitted that the only power vested with the arbitrator was to determine the amount of fair compensation. While doing so, the learned arbitrator had no power vested in him, either under the Highways Act or the Act -to act as an appeal court or to even otherwise pass an order to set aside the order of the competent authority and to remit the matter back for re-determination.

4. Then, referring to Section-34(2)(a)(iv) read with Section-34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, it has been submitted that the award of the learned arbitrator to the extent, he has remitted the matter back for re-determination, is both outside the scope of implied reference and against the public policy of India.

5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-claimant submits, the competent authority had by order dated 31.01.2013 correctly valued 1200 sq. mtrs. out of the total area 3600 sq. mtrs. as non-agricultural land. The balance area 2400 sq. mtrs was undervalued as agricultural land. Hence arbitration had been sought. By his award dated 25.10.2016, the learned arbitrator has valued the 2400 sq. mtrs. land also as non-agricultural land with commercial potential. The rate of nonagricultural land being specified in the order dated 31.01.2013 passed by the competent authority, the total compensation amount may be paid out to the claimant, accordingly. It is his submission that nothing remains to be done by the competent authority and the respondent-claimant has already become entitled to payment at the enhanced rate. Accordingly, the learned District Judge has rightly rejected the objections filed against the award dated 25.10.2016.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, there can be no two opinions about the scope of the proceedings before the arbitrator. Such proceedings arose purely in terms of the provision of Section 3-G (5) of the Highways Ac