Point of Law: Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will have no application in view of the fact that provisions governing limitation are contained in the Customs Act. It is so for in a matter of this nature the Tribunal was required to consider the application filed by he appellant which was filed within a reasonable time.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Shri H.M. Srivastava and Shri Neeraj Srivastava, counsel for the petitioner.

2. The respondent Nos. 3 to 8 instituted Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 244 of 2008 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act, 1988') before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, District-Bulandshahar (hereinafter referred to as, 'Tribunal') against the petitioner and respondent No. 2 claiming compensation for the death of Shri Nanak Chandra in an accident occurring on 16.6.2008 and caused due to rash and negligent driving of Truck No. U.P. 82 J 9175. The petitioner is the owner of the vehicle, i.e., Truck No. U.P. 82 J 9175 and the vehicle was insured with respondent No. 2, i.e., The National Insurance Company Limited. The respondent Nos. 3 to 8 are the dependents of (Late) Shri Nanak Chand. The Tribunal through its award dated 1.3.2011 awarded, to the claimants, a compensation of Rs. 3,69,500/-with a simple interest of 6% per annum calculated from the date of the institution of the claim petition. In its judgment, the Tribunal recorded that the petitioner had not filed the fitness certificate of the vehicle and, therefore, the Tribunal held that the petitioner, i.e., the owner of the vehicle and not the respondent no. 2, i.e., the Insurance Company, was liable to pay compensation. The petitioner filed a review application for review of the award dated 1.3.2011 alleging that the vehicle was a new vehicle and was registered for the first time on 25.1.2007 and, therefore, under Rule 62(1)(a) of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Rules, 1989'), the fitness certificate of the vehicle was valid for two years from the date of registration, i.e., from 25.1.2007. The ground for review was that in cases of new vehicles, i.e., vehicles registered for the first time, fitness certificate of the vehicle is issued along with the registration certificate and the petitioner had filed the registration certificate of the vehicle, therefore, it was evident from the documents filed by the petitioner that the vehicle had a fitness certificate. On the aforesaid application of the petitioner, Review Application Case No. 92/2011 was registered before the Tribunal and the Tribunal vide its order dated 18.5.2013 dismissed the said application on the ground that it did not have the power to review its award.

3. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the award dated 1.3.2011 passed by the Tribunal as well as the order dated 18.5.2013 of the Tribunal dismissing the review application filed by the petitioner.

4. Challenging the order dated 18.5.2013, the counsel for the petitioner have argued that a vehicle which is registered for the first time is issued a certificate of fitness alongwith the registration certificate itself and the fitness certificate is valid for a period of two years from the date of issue. It was argued that the registration certificate of the vehicle showing that the vehicle had, for the first time, been registered on 25.1.2007 was on record and the said document, by virtue of Rule 62(1)(a) of the Rules was sufficient evidence to prove that the vehicle had a fitness certificate on the relevant date, i.e., the date of accident and the failure of the petitioner to file the fitness certificate was not sufficient to absolve the Insurance Company from paying compensation. It was argued, that for the aforesaid reason, the award of the Tribunal releasing the Insurance Company and holding the petitioner/owner liable to pay compensation to the claimants on the ground that the petitioner had not filed the fitness certificate of the vehicle was contrary to law and thus liable to be quashed. It was further argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the failure of the Tribunal to consider the aforesaid aspect in its award dated 1.3.2011 was a mistake on the part of the Tribunal causing injustice to the petitioner and there