Point of law: The legal position with regard to a subsequent allottee or of one to whose fair price shop card holders may be temporarily attached is no longer res integra. It has been authoritatively held that once the licence of the original allottee stands restored, no legal rights exist in the allottee to whom card holders may have been temporarily attached. The original allottee alone is entitled to continue and that the interim arrangement made by the State-respondents during the period when his licence stood cancelled stands effaced.

JUDGMENT :

SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.

1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 01.07.2021 passed by the Joint Commissioner (Food), Lucknow Division, Lucknow, in so far as he has rejected the application for interim relief and staying the operation of the order passed by the S.D.M. cancelling the Fair Price Shop License of the petitioner.

3. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the case of Mool Chand Yadav and Another vs. Raza Buland Sugar Company, (1982) 3 SCC 484, the Supreme Court observed that if the Appeal is admitted then interim order should ordinarily be granted staying the order impugned. In the said case the Supreme Court considering the right of a licensee/allottee/tenant aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by the Authorities. It observed that in case the Appeal is eventually allowed the appellant would be entitled to continue in possession. If the order impugned in the Appeal is not suspended the appellant would have to vacate the premises and hand over the possession to the respondents in obedience to the order passed by the lower court. Hence, judicial approach required that during the pendency of the Appeal, the operation of the order having serious civil consequence must be suspended. In case, the Appeal is admitted and eventually allowed but possession has been already handed over in pursuance of the order passed by the lower court then the Appeal itself would be rendered infructuous. To prevent irreparable loss to the appellant and rendering of the Appeal as infructuous at the time of final decision, interim orders should ordinarily be passed by the Appellate Court staying the operation of the order under challenge.

4. The arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner although substantiated by a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mool Chand Yadav and Another (Supra) is misconceived in view of the fact that the legal possession with regard to the subsequent allottee or of one whose fair price shop card holders may be temporary attached is no longer resintegra. In Special Appeal No. 669/2018 (Sukhpal Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others) the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment and order dated 03.08.2018 has observed that once the license of the original allottee stands restored, no legal right exists in the licensee to whom card holders may have been temporary attached:

“The legal position with regard to a subsequent allottee or of one to whose fair price shop card holders may be temporarily attached is no longer res integra. It has been authoritatively held that once the licence of the original allottee stands restored, no legal rights exist in the allottee to whom card holders may have been temporarily attached. The consistent view taken by this Court as well as the Supreme Court on the subject is that the original allottee alone is entitled to continue and that the interim arrangement made by the State-respondents during the period when his licence stood cancelled stands effaced. One may in this connection only refer to the following pertinent observations as entered by the Supreme Court in Poonam vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2016 (2) SCC 799 to the following effect:

“48. In the instant case, shop no. 2 had become vacant. The appellant was allotted the shop, may be in the handicapped quota but such allotment is the resultant factor of the said shop falling vacant. The original allottee, that is the respondent, assailed his cancellation and ultimately succeeded in appeal. We are not concerned with the fact that the appellant herein was allowed to put her stand in the appeal. She was neither a necessary nor a proper party. The appellate authority permitted her to participate but that neither changes the situation nor does it confer any legal status on her. She would have continued to hold the shop had the original allottee lost the appeal. She cannot assail the said order in a writ petiti