Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Prem Narayan Tiwari, Sr. Advocate Sri Anil Bhushan
For the Respondent: Brajesh Kumar Dwivedi, Shiv Om Vikram Singh Chauhan

Key Points: - The permission dated 28.11.2019 is prima facie not a lease since it lacks premium or rent and does not recite consideration (!) . - The appellate court erred in holding that Section 106 notice was mandatory before instituting the suit since no valid lease exists (!) . - The trial court found a prima facie case, balance of convenience in favor of petitioners, and that irreparable loss would occur if the brick-kiln and excavation continued; appellate court reversed (!) (!) (!) . - The document granting rights on 28.11.2019 is described as permission, not a lease; thus respondents cannot be treated as tenants by holding over (!) . - The court held that excavation and running a brick-kiln would damage agriculture and land fertility, justifying interim relief in favor of petitioners (!) (!) . - The final order sets aside the appellate court’s decision and restrains the respondents from running brick-kiln business on the suit property (!) . - The court directs expeditious disposal of the suit with possible costs for adjournments if necessary (!) .

What is the nature of the permission granted by petitioners-plaintiffs to respondents-defendants on 28.11.2019 – whether it constitutes a lease or not?

What are the prerequisites for a temporary injunction in a suit for injunction where the property is jointly owned and possession is in dispute, and is notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act required if no valid lease exists?

What is the Court’s conclusion regarding the maintainability of a suit for temporary injunction where the defendant is in possession and there is no prayer for a decree of possession?