JUDGMENT :

1. This Intra Court Appeal has been filed questioning the legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 29.3.2019 passed in Writ (A) No. 4359 of 2019 (Famina Singh v. State of U.P. and others) whereby the learned Single Judge has found no good ground to entertain the writ petition and dismissed the same as it related to termination of the contractual engagement relying upon the Division Bench decision rendered in Rajesh Bhardwaj v. Union of India, 2019(2) ADJ 830.

2. It has been vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the decision rendered in the case of Rajesh Bhardwaj v. Union of India, relied upon by the learned Single Judge does not lay down the proposition of law that a writ petition at the instance of a contractual employee would not be maintainable and the learned Single Judge manifestly erred in law in non-suiting the writ petitioner/appellant on that score. Non renewal of a contractual appointment very much lies within the purview of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitioner though initially appointed on the post of Female Staff Nurse on contract basis vide order dated 15.4.2015 had been working continuously without break in service under orders of extension being passed from time to time. vide order dated 12.3.2018 the Respondent No. 3 issued a notice to the petitioner that her services will be terminated after giving one month payment. Against the termination notice issued by the Respondent No. 3, the petitioner filed a writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8457 of 2018, which was disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to approach the respondent authority for redressal of her grievances. In pursuance of the order passed in the writ petition, the petitioner filed a detailed representation on 2.4.2018 before the respondent authority which was rejected vide order dated 10.5.2018. After rejection of his representation the petitioner again filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 4359 of 2019 which was dismissed vide order dated 29.3.2019.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents and have perused the record.

4. The factum that the appellant/petitioner was appointed on contract basis vide order dated 15.4.2015 and such appointment was the contractual appointment is not in dispute.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and having perused the decision rendered in the case of Rajesh Bhardwaj v. Union of India (Supra) we find that the coordinate Bench while dealing with the question Nos. 2, 3 and 4 framed by it opined as under :

“30. ........ In these circumstances, in the cases like petitioner, consistently it has been laid down that employment is simply a part of contract. If employment is terminated or contract of service is terminated, Court shall not grant relief of reinstatement, i.e. specific performance of contract of personal service, as it is barred by the provisions of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ''Act, 1963'') and, therefore, no remedy under Article 226 shall be available since employee, if complains about wrongful termination of service, then must avail remedy in common law by claiming damages.”

6. Then again in para 31 of the aforesaid judgment while drawing a distinction between nature of appointment/engagement governed by statute or statutory rules i.e. governed by ''status'' and governed by a contract of service opined as under :

“31. ....... Nature of engagement/appointment of petitioner is not to be governed by 'status' but by a 'contract of service' entered into between master and servant. A distinction between an appointment under a contract and status was noticed and explained by Supreme Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889. Court held that when a matter is governed by status, the employee has no vested cont