The main legal point established in the judgment is the unconstitutionality of excluding married daughters from the definition of 'family' of dependents for compassionate appointment, emphasizing the need to consider the financial status of the petitioner and her husband.

JUDGMENT :

1. Counter affidavit filed today is taken on record.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri R.C. Dwivedi submits that he does not want to file rejoinder affidavit.

3. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.

4. The legal issue that emerges out for consideration relates to the claim of a married daughter for compassionate appointment on the ground that she and her husband were dependents of the deceased father who died in harness while working as Daftari (Class-IV employee) in a recognized aided Institution.

5. The claim of the petitioner when was not being considered by the District Inspector of Schools, she came to file a writ petition being Writ -A No. 37939 of 2014 which was disposed of on 30.07.2014 with a direction to the District Inspector of Schools to take a decision in the matter. The District Inspector of Schools passed order on 05.11.2014 rejecting the claim of the petitioner on the ground that as per regulation 103 of Chapter III of Intermediate Education Act, 1921 a married daughter could not come within the definition of 'family' of dependents. Petitioner again came to this Court vide Writ -A No. 4553 of 2015 which was disposed of with a direction dated 13.09.2022 to decide the claim of the petitioner afresh in the light of judgment of Smt. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. and another (Writ - C No. 60881 of 2015 decided on 04.12.2015) and also a judgment passed in identically placed one Seema Gupta, petitioner in Writ - A No. 9842 of 2022, Seema Gupta v. State of U.P. & 3 Others (decided on 13.07.2022), the claim of the petitioner has again come to be rejected.

6. The argument advanced by Shri Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that in view of the judgment of Division Bench in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra), presided over by the Chief Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud (as his Lordship then was), married daughter has been taken to be falling within the definition of the word 'family' on analogy and analysis of the legal principle discussed by the Division Bench as under :

"While assessing the rival submissions, it must be noted at the outset that the definition of the expression "family" in Rule 2 (c) incorporates the categories of heirs of a deceased government servant. Among them are the wife or husband, sons and adopted sons, unmarried daughters, unmarried adopted daughters, widowed daughters and widowed daughters-in-law. Clause (ii) of Rule 2 (c) brings a son as well as an adopted son within the purview of the expression "family" irrespective of marital status. A son who is married continues to be within the ambit of the expression "family" for the purpose of Rule 2 (c). But by the stroke of a legislative definition, a daughter who is married is excluded from the scope and purview of the family of a deceased government servant unless she falls within the category of a widowed daughter. The invidious discrimination that is inherent in Rule 2 (c) lies in the fact that a daughter by reason of her marriage is excluded from the ambit of the expression "family". Her exclusion operates by reason of marriage and, whether or not she was at the time of the death of the deceased government servant dependent on him. Marriage does not exclude a son from the ambit of the expression "family". But marriage excludes a daughter. This is invidious. A married daughter who has separated after marriage and may have been dependent on the deceased would as a result of this discrimination stand excluded. A divorced daughter would similarly stand excluded. Even if she is dependent on her father, she would not be eligible for compassionate appointment only because of the fact that she is not "unmarried". The only basis of the exclusion is marriage and but for her marriage, a daughter would not be excluded from the definition of the expression "family".

7. The Division Bench also relied upon its earlier judgment in the case of Isha Tyagi v. State of U.P. & 3 Others, (Writ-C No. 41279 of 2014, d