The Magistrate can independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the offence, not bound by the conclusions of the investigating officer.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Shri Dharmendra Singhal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Shivendra Raj Singhal, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Prashant Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for opposite party no.2 as well as learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.

2. The instant appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been filed by the appellant-Param Singh with the prayer to set-aside the impugned judgment and order dated 17.01.2023 passed by learned Special Judge (S.C./S.T.) Act, Amroha in Sessions Case No. 863 of 2022 (State of U.P. vs. Adarsh Kumar Paricharak), arising out of Case Crime No. 121 of 2022, under Sections 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(r) Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Police Station Hasanpur, District Amroha and to stay the further proceedings of the aforesaid sessions case.

3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant while drawing the attention of this Court towards the impugned order of date 17.01.2023, submits that the Special Court has committed manifest illegality in passing the impugned order, whereby the cognizance has been taken and the appellant has been summoned to face trial under Sections 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(r) Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

4. Elaborating further, it is submitted that after lodging of the first information report by the opposite party no.2, the case was investigated by a senior officer of the police and after investigation the charge sheet was filed only against co-accused Adarsh Kumar and the trial Court vide order dated 18.10.2022 had taken the cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. and vide order dated 09.12.2022 had issued the process against co-accused Adarsh Kumar and the case was listed for disposal of application moved by the opposite party no.2/informant under Section 190(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C.

5. It is further submitted that by passing impugned order on the basis of an application moved by the opposite party no.2, the Special Court appears to have recalled its earlier order of date 18.10.2022 and 09.12.2022, which is not permissible in criminal law and also keeping in view Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. and have summoned appellant also to face trial under Sections 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(da) of S.C./S.T. Act.

6. It is vehemently submitted that while taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C., the Special Court has not considered the material which was collected by the investigating officer during the course of investigation, while the informant in his statement recorded by the investigating officer under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. had categorically stated that he is having a video of the incident, which would be provided to the investigating officer and has actually provided the same and an opinion with regard to this video clip has also been mentioned by the investigating officer in the case diary, transcript of which has also been placed at page no. 58 of the paper book, wherein the investigating officer has categorically opined that perusal of the video would reveal that no obscene language has been used by the appellant and he is persuading the teachers to go back to their classes and the other teachers are constantly complaining of using abusive language by the co-accused Adarsh Kumar with informant Alok Kumar and also of intimidating him. However, the Principal namely Param Singh (Appellant) is seen sitting with calm and is persuading the teachers to say their version with calm and control. This video is also made part and parcel of the case diary and strangely the Special Court though has noticed this video in the impugned order but has opined, contrary to the fact, that this video is recorded after the incident. Thus, the Special Court has travelled beyond the ambit of Section 190(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. and appears to have summoned the appellant on the basis of ‘surmis