JUDGMENT :

Ryves, Piggott, JJ.

This is a first appeal from an order of remand, and is one of a series of connected appeals which may be disposed of by a single judgement. In Baraut, in the Meerut district, there is certain land which is the property of Government, though it has been assigned for purposes of management to the Notified Area Committee. That body desired to establish a market upon this land in the neighbourhood of a railway station. It was accordingly arranged that leases of portions of the said land should be granted for a period of years to a number of traders and merchants, subject to certain conditions, the object of which was to secure the effective establishment of the desired market. Owing to circumstances with which we are not concerned the scheme has fallen through, the lessees have taken no action under their leases, and no market has been established. The case for the plaintiffs is that the lessees have broken their contract and are liable under the terms of the contract for various sums of money, for the recovery of which these suits have been brought. The lessees set up number of defences, with only one of which we are now concerned. There was indeed another technical defence impugning the right of the plaintiffs to sue upon leases in which the Secretary of State for India is the ostensible lessor, but the finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to sue as “assigns” of the Secretary of State has not been attacked in argument before us and appears to be correct. What we have to deal with is a point of registration law. In each of the suits in question the plaintiffs tendered in evidence as the basis of their claim an unregistered lease purporting to be by the Secretary of State for India in favour of the defendants. The court of first instance held that all these leases required registration under the provisions of section 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act (No. XVI of 1908); as they were not registered, they were inadmissible in evidence and could not affect the immovable property described therein. If this finding is correct, the suits must necessarily fail. It has, however, been reversed by the lower appellate court, which has remanded all the suits for disposal on the merits. The defendants are appealing against these orders of remand. These orders cannot be supported on the grounds on which they proceed. The learned District Judge has in effect held that each of the leases in suit is a lease for a period of not more than one year, because it contains a covenant giving the lessor a right of re-entry in the event of a breach of conditions on the part of the lessee, and there is at least one condition which must either be fulfilled or broken by the lessee in the course of the first year of the lease. The “term “of a lease for purposes of registration must, however, be understood to mean the period for which the lessee is protected against dispossession at the will and pleasure of his lessor, or in other words, the length of time for, which the lessee is entitled to continue in possession, provided he himself fulfils all the stipulated conditions. The leases before us are, therefore, leases for a “term” of thirty years. They are also in our opinion leases “reserving a yearly rent.” The District Judge has referred to certain reported cases, such as Kliayali v. Husain Bakhsh, (1886) I.L.R., 8 All. 198 and Khuda Bakhsh v. Sheo Din, (1886) I.L.R., 8 All. 405. The case of Intizam Fatima v. Ali Bakhsh, (1911) 8 A.L.J., 609 was decided with express reference to the terms of the Registration Act (No. XX of 1866) which was in force when the lease then under consideration was registered. There does not seem to have been anything in the provisions of the leases discussed in any of these cases which bound the lessor to maintain the lessee's possession for a longer period than one year, if he did not see fit to do so, however scrupulously the lessee might have performed his part of the contract.

On behalf of the