ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Raghubar Dayal - Appellant
Versus
Panna Lal & Ors. - Respondents
Second Appeal No. 360 of 1944
Decided On : 29-04-1946
JUDGMENT
Allsop, Ag. C.J.
1. This is a second appeal against a decree of the Civil Judge of Jhansi. The suit which has given rise to the appeal was instituted in the Court of an Assistant Collector of the first class in Jhansi by the appellant, Seth Baghubar Dayal, in order to obtain the ejectment of Panna Lal and others from certain agricultural plots upon the ground that the plaintiff was the lambardar of the Mahal in which the plots lay and that the defendants were trespassers. Panna Lal claimed to be in possession as a cosharer in the mahal. The other defendants alleged that Panna Lal was alone in possession and that they were not in possession at all. The learned Assistant Collector framed an issue upon the question of Panna Lal's proprietary title and sent it to the civil Court for decision. The decision was that Panna Lal was a cosharer in the mahal. The learned Assistant Collector seems in error to have thought that the finding was against Panna Lal and he passed a decree for ejectment. Panna Lal appealed to the Civil Judge who set aside the decree of the learned Assistant Collector and dismissed the suit.
2. The second appeal has been referred by two learned Judges of this Court to this Full Bench because of a difference of opinion upon a question of law between this Court and the Board of Revenue. The case of this Court in which the opinion was expressed was Sultan Ahmad Khan Vs. Jalaluddin and Another, AIR 1940 All 370 The question which arose in that case was whether a lambardar could sue a cosharer for ejectment in a revenue Court under the provisions of S. 44, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The decision of this Court was that he could not do so. The decision turned upon terms of S. 44 of the Act which in so far as they are relevant, are that a person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land without She consent of the landholder shall be liable to ejectment. The landholder as defined in that Act was the person to whom rent was payable. This Court held that all the cosharers including the lambardar were landholders because the rent was ultimately payable to all of them in proportion to their shares in the mahal although the lambardar might, in some circumstances, have the right in the first instance to collect it. I do not think that it is necessary for us now to go into the question whether that decision was right, although I think that it was, The law is now contained in S. 180, United Provinces. Tenancy Act, 1939, which is not exactly in the same terms as S. 44 of the Act of 1926. The present' section is as follows:
(1) A person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land other wise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, or when the joint consent of more than one person is required on the suit of any one or more of such persons, and also to pay damages, which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants.
(2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed the persons in possession shall on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be, become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots.
3. In my judgment this section is intended to apply to persons one of whom is on claims to be a landholder and the other of whom claims to be in possession as a tenant. I would draw attention to the words 'admit him as a tenant' in the first sub-section and to the whole of the second sub-section. We have been referred to the decision of the Board of Revenue in the case of [Tej Singh v. Khem Chand] (41) 1941 R.D. 110. It has always been held that cosharers in a mahal are in the same position as tenants-in-common i
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