1912 Supreme(All) 87
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
CHAMIER, KARAMAT HUSAIN, JJ.
Kishori Lal - Appellant
Versus
Todar Singh - Respondent
Decided On : 18-01-1912
JUDGMENT
Chamier, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellant for his share of the profits of two properties which may be called khata No. 1 and khata No. 2 in mouzah Chiti. The suit relates to the years 1314, 1315 and 1316 Faslis. The appellant was a recorded co-sharer during the years in question. Respondent was lambardar of khata No. 1 during the same period. The claim for profits in khata No. 2 is not before as in appeal and may be disregarded.
2. In khata No. 1 there were five co-sharers, each owning a one-fifth share. Bach of them was in possession of separate lands on account of his share. In other words, the whole property was held by them as sir or khud kasht. The actual cultivators of the land were treated as the tenants of one or other of the co-sharers. The whole of the share of one of the co-sharers named Charan Singh excepting ten bighas was sold at execution sales to the appellant in or before 1901. The remaining ten bighas were sold to the respondent. The result was that Charan Singh became ex proprietary tenant of the whole of the lands constituting his share. At the instance of the appellant the Revenue Authorities fixed the rent to be paid by Charan Singh. In August 1904 the appellant sued Charan Singh for the rent of his holding for the years 1309, 1310 and 1311 Faslis and obtained a decree. In July 1905 the appellant had Charan Singh formally rejected from the holding on account of nonpayment of the amount decreed. Bat, as so often happens in such cases, Charan Singh did not give up the land and in January 19C6 the appellant brought a suit against him in the Civil Court for possession and for mesne profits. Charan Singh pleaded that he was tenant of the land and was referred to the Revenue Court which held that he was no longer tenant of the land. The Munsif then gave the appellant a decree for possession and for mesne profits and his decree was affirmed on appeal in June 1907. Shortly after that, the respondent commenced proceedings for partition of the lands comprised in the khata. In the course of those proceedings, in January 1910, the appellant presented a petition to the Court in which he urged that what had been Charan Singh's land was hip, the appellant's, separate maqhuza and should be allotted to him. The present suit was instituted in June 1900. The appellant claims his share of the profits of the land in the khata for the years 1314, 1315 and 1316 Fashis. He admits, or rather his learned Pleader in this Court, admits, that the respondent did not in fact collect the rents of what has been described as the appellant's maqhuza, i.e., the land which was Charan Singh's holding less the 10 bighas above mentioned, but he says that it was the duty of the respondent as lambardar to collect those rents and the respondent is liable for them u/s 164(2) of the Tenancy Act. The respondent has pleaded and it has been found that each of the original co-sharers was in possession of separate lands on account of his share. He urges that Charan Singh became the tenant of the appellant in respect of all the lands constituting that share; that the appellant alone has been in possession of those lands through Charan Singh, and that he (the respondent) has never been in possession or collected the rents thereof. The question whether a co-sharer in a zemindari becomes on the transfer of his share the tenant of the transferee alone or of the whole proprietary body has been discussed before us at length, of Chote Lal v. Ramadhin 13 O.C. 70 : 5 Ind. Cas. 945 Evans J. and I held that the co-sharer becomes the tenant of the transferee alone. In Bhagwandin v. Vehi Prasad 12 Ind. Cas. 630 decided on October 31st, 1911 Griffin, J., held that the co-sharer becomes the tenant of the whole proprietary body, and the Rame view is involved in the decision of Stanley, C.J, and Banerji, J., in Second Appeal No. 538 of 1807 decided on March 19th, 1909. The difficulties pointed out in our judgment in the case of Chote L