JUDGMENT

Pramada Charan Banerji, J. - In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen the plaintiffs claimed, among other reliefs, possession of a share in the village of Baukata, and it is this part of the claim with which we are concerned in this appeal. It appears that certain co-sharers in the aforesaid village applied for partition of their shares u/s 107 of the Land Revenue Act. Notice was issued to all the recorded co-sharers as required by Section 110 of the Act, and thereupon an application was made on the 11th of September, 1912, by [the parties to this suit and other co-sharers under Clause (2) of the section, praying for partition of their shares. In that application they set forth the extent of the shares which they prayed should be formed into one lot or qura. After this application was made, a proceeding was drawn up by the Revenue Court u/s 114 of the Act, declaring the basis upon which partition was to be effected, and in that proceeding the extent of the plaintiffs' share was put down as that mentioned in the application to which I have referred. Nearly a year after this, that is, in August, 1913, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit. The question to be determined is whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 233 (k) of the Land Revenue Act. I should have considered that the point was fully concluded by authority in this Court, had it not been for the decision in the recent case of Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh ILR (1916) All. 243. In my opinion the present suit is in substance a suit in respect of the partition of a mahal within the meaning of Clause (k) of Section 233. That section provides that no Civil Court shall take cognizance of a suit in respect of the several matters mentioned in the section. One of these matters is "partition or union of mahals, except as provided in Sections 111 and 112." In determining whether the section applies we have to look to the substance of the claim and not to the form in which it is dressed up. If, as observed by STRACHEY, C. J., in Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram ILR (1901) All. 291 the object of the suit is to establish the plaintiffs ownership and possession in respect of property as to which the revenue authorities in making a partition have declared that it should go to the defendant, that is a matter relating to partition, and a Civil Court is forbidden to take cognizance of it by the provisions of Section 233. I am unable to distinguish this case from the case last mentioned, which is very similar to the present. It is a Full Bench decision by five Judges of this Court, and the view taken in it was held in subsequent cases also. I see no reason to depart from the course of rulings on the point. No question of res judicata, in my opinion, arises in a case like this. Had the question of the title of the parties been decided by the Revenue Court under Sections 111 and 112, the matter would have been res judicata. In my opinion the present suit is barred by reason of the prohibition contained in Section 233, and not on the ground of res judicata. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to say whether I agree or disagree with the ruling in Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh ILR (1916) All. 243 referred to above, as the facts of that case are different from those of the present case, but if it is deemed that the principle involved in that case is the same as that which arises in this, I am unable, with great deference, to acquiesce in all that was said in that case. In my judgement the decision of the learned Judge, of this Court from which this appeal has been preferred undo the Letters Patent is correct and I would dismiss the appeal.

Tudball, J.

2. The facts of the case have just been stated by my learned colleague Banerji, J. It is unnecessary to rep eat them. In substance the present suit is merely an effort to turn round and annul the partition made by the Revenue Court. The appellants were parties to that partition, the property in dispute was t