JUDGMENT

Mahmood, J. - The preliminary facts of this case and the points of law to which they give rise were set forth by me in my order of the 17th July 1888, whereby the case was referred to a Bench of two Judges consisting of my brother Straight and myself, and upon the case coming on for hearing before us, we, by our order of the 31st July 1889, remanded the case under s. 566 of the CPC to the lower appellate Court for a clear finding on the issue, whether on the 24th October 1886, or about that time (as asserted in paragraph 4 of the plaint) there was a demand made by the plaintiff to his wife, the defendant, Musammat Kaunsilia, to return to him, and a refusal by her to do so. Under this issue the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has found that the elopement of the plaintiff's wife and his demand for her return and her refusal took place more than five years before suit, that Musammat Kaunsilia, the defendant, had ever since been cohabiting with Bechu, defendant, and by him has given birth to two children, one of whom is still alive, and that neither demand by the husband nor refusal by the wife of conjugal rights was proved to have been made within two years before the suit.

2. To these findings no objections have been taken by either party under s. 567 of the Civil Procedure Code, but the learned pleader for the respondent argues that these findings are fatal to the suit. He contends:--

First that a remedy by suit for restitution of conjugal rights by enforcing return and cohabitation is not contemplated by the Hindu Law, and therefore a suit of this character is not entertain-able by the Civil Court.

Secondly, that even if such a suit is maintainable, a definite demand and refusal of restitution of conjugal rights is a condition precedent to the maintainability of such an action.

Thirdly, that after such demand has been made the lapse of two years will bar the action for ever under clauses 34 and 35 of sch. ii of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877).

Fourthly, that under the circumstances of this case the defendant, Musammat Kaunsilia, must be treated as a deserted wife and no longer amenable to the husband's demand for restitution of conjugal rights under the Hindu Law, and

Fifthly, that in any case the granting of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is entirely within the discretionary power of the Court, which, under the circumstances of this case, should not be exercised.

3. The argument for the appellant contests all these points and aims at showing that the suit is maintainable, that it is not barred by limitation, and should be decreed under the Hindu Law.

4. It will be convenient to consider the case in the order of the points urged on behalf of the respondent.

5. Upon the first point I am of opinion that there is ample authority in the Hindu Law to show that it is the duty of a wife to live with her husband in conjugal cohabitation, discharging such functions as the domestic law of the Hindus assigns to her. These 'authorities are collected in Colebrooke's Digest of Hindu Law, Volume II, Book IV, Chapter I and Chapter II, and, when read together, furnish a very interesting and instructive picture of the domestic conjugal life of the husband and wife as contemplated by the Hindu Law.

6. Some of these texts may be quoted here. Perhaps the most important is one of Manu, with which Chapter II of Colebrooke's Digest (Vol. II, page 137) opens, on the duties of a wife:--

In childhood must a female be dependent on her father; in youth, on her husband; her lord being dead, on her sons;......a woman must never seek independence. Never let her wish to separate herself from her father, her husband, or her sons; for, by a separation from them she exposes both families to contempt. She must always live with a cheerful temper, with good management in the affairs of the house, with great care of the household furniture and with a frugal hand in all her expenses. Him to whom her father has given her, or her brother, with the