JUDGMENT

Iqbal Ahmad, J. - This is an appeal by a creditor against an order of special Judge, first grade, exercising jurisdiction under the Encumbered Estates Act (25 of 1934), dismissing the claim preferred by the appellant. The case furnishes a remarkable instance of the anomalies which arise by a literal interpretation of the various provisions contained in the Act and points to the desirability of the Legislature stepping in and making suitable amendments in the Act.

2. The question that arises for decision is whether claims preferred by creditors who advanced debts to landlord-applicants after the passing of the order u/s 6 of the Act, can or cannot be adjudicated upon by a special Judge in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. The question arises under the following circumstances : The landlord-applicants, who are the respondents in the present appeal, filed an application before the Collector u/s 4 of the Act on 15th April 1936. The Collector, on 4th May 1936, passed an order u/s 6 of the Act forwarding the application to the special Judge. Thereafter on 24th May, 1936, Ramjatan Pandey, the appellant in the present appeal, is alleged to have advanced to the respondents a sum of Rs. 1600 on the basis of a promissory note. The landlord-applicants filed a written statement in accordance with Section 8 of the Act and there after the notices prescribed by Section 9 were' published and issued. Ramjatan Pandey then filed a written statement claiming the amount due to him on the basis of the promissory note. The special Judge "dismissed" the claim holding that, as the debt claimed by the appellant was advanced after the application u/s 4, he had no jurisdiction to examine the claim of the appellant or to pass a decree in his favour. This decision of the special Judge is unassailable in view of the clear wording of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 which enacts as follows:

The Special Judge shall examine each claim...and...shall determine the amount, if any, due from the landlord to the claimant on the date of the application u/s 4.

3. It is clear from this provision that the scope of an enquiry u/s 14 is restricted, and the jurisdiction of the special Judge is confined to an examination of the claims with respect to debts due from the landlord "on the date of the application u/s 4." It follows that creditors, who advanced debts to landlords after the data of the application u/s 4, cannot have their claims, with respect to such debts, investigated and adjudicated upon by a special Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act. It is true that there are no words of limitation in Section 9, and according to that section all persons having claims in respect of private debts against the landlord have to submit a written statement of their claims within the period prescribed by Sub-section (3) of that section. There is nothing in that section to show that it contemplates only such creditors who have claims against the landlord with respect to debts advanced be, fore the date of the application u/s 4. But, having regard to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 14, such a limitation must be read into Section 9 with a view to harmonise the various provisions in the Act.

4. Similarly Section 13 is couched in general terms, and, if literally interpreted, uncontrolled by the provisions contained in the other sections of the Act, would seem to provide that all claims against the landlord-debtor, including claims with respect to debts advanced after the date of the application u/s 4, would be deemed to be discharged, if the creditor failed to file his claim in accordance with Section 9 of the Act. Here, again, such a wide interpretation of Section 13 is not permissible in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 14. Section 13 must, therefore, be held to be confined in its operation only to claims with respect to private debts incurred by the landlord before the date of the application u/s 4.

5. One is, however, up against a glaring