JUDGMENT

Henry Richard, C.J. - This appeal arises out of a suit to enforce payment of a sum of Rs. 10,000, principal and interest alleged to be due on foot of a mortgage, dated the 16th of July 1690, by sale of the mortgaged property. The mortgage-deed provided that the mortgagors should pay the principal amount secured in ton years by instalments of Rs. 625 yearly and that the interest should be paid monthly. There was this, further Clause: "If we fail to pay the interest aforesaid in any month or the principal by the stipulated period, as specified above, or no payment is made in a year, the mortgagee shall, under all these circumstances, be at liberty to realize the entire amount with the interest aforesaid in a lump sum through Court by means of a suit from the mortgaged and other moveable and Immovable property and the person of us, the executants." Later on the deed has a provision which has been translated as follows: "If the mortgagee in order to get interest does not bring a suit in default of any instalment and we are unable to pay the money, the interest should continue up to the stipulated period of ten years and also after it up to the date, of realization." This last Clause seems to me simply to mean that the mortgaged property should remain and be security for the interest even if no suit was brought to enforce the monthly payment. No payment was ever made upon foot of either principal or interest up to the date of the institution of the present suit on the 12th of June 1912.

2. The Court below has dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding that the claim is barred by limitation. The plaintiffs appeal.

3. In my opinion the decision of the Court below is correct. It is admitted that the Article of the Limitation Act which applies is Article 132. See the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai 30 M. 426 : 17 M.L.J. 444 : 4 A.L.J. 625 : 9 Bom. L.R. 1104 : 6 C.L.J. 379 : 11 C.W.N. 1005 : 34 I.A. 187 : 2 M.L.T. 333. This Article deals with "suits to enforce payment of money charged upon Immovable property." The period of limitation prescribed is 12 years and time begins to run from the date when the money sued for becomes due. No doubt if the mortgagors had fulfilled their contract, the mortgagees would not have been entitled to sue until the expiration of ten years from the date of the mortgage, and in that case the present suit would have been within time. The provision, however, in the deed admittedly entitled the mortgagge to bring a suit to recover principal and interest after the first default, and if it can be said that the money then "became due" the suit is barred by limitation. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the mortgagees were entitled to sue, or not to sue and that accordingly on the true construction of the mortgage-deed the money did not "become due" until the expiration of ten years from the date of the mortgage. I cannot agree with this contention. It seems to me that money is "due" when it can he legally demanded, and it is admitted in the present case that the money secured by this mortgage could have been legally demanded and recovered after the first default, and had a suit been brought for its recovery by sale of the mortgaged property the defendants could not have pleaded that such a suit was premature. For this there is the high authority of the English Court of Appeal in the case of Reeves v. Butcher (1891) 2 Q.B.D. 509 : 65 L.T. 329 : 39 W.R. 629 : 60 L.J.Q.B. 619. In that case the plaintiff lent money to the defendant under a written agreement for a fixed period of five years "subject to the power to call in the same at an earlier period in the events hereinafter mentioned," The defendant agreed to pay interest quarterly and the plaintiff agreed not to call in the money for five years if the defendant should regularly pay interest. It was further provided that if the defendant should make default in payment of any quarterly payment