JUDGMENT

These three petitions under article 226 of the Constitution raise common points and can be conveniently dealt with by a common judgment.

The prayer contained in the petitions is that an order of rectification u/s 35 of the Income Tax Act dated March 3, 1960, made in all the three cases and notices of demand of the same date in consequence of the order of rectification may be quashed. It is also prayed that in the assessment forms accompanying the notices of demand dated March 3, 1960, the interest charged u/s 18A of the Act may be knocked off.

The facts giving rise of the petitions are there was originally a Hindu undivided family carrying on business under the name and style of Hirday Narain Yogendra Prakash. Hirday Narain was the father and Yogendra Prakash was his son from his first wife. On September 30, 1949, there was partial partition in respect of the business and with effect from October 1, 1949, a partnership was constituted by the father and the son, Yogendra Prakash. To the benefits of this partnership out minor sons of Hirday Narain from his second wife were admitted. Three of these minor sons are petitioners in these writ petitions, Devendra Prakash in Petition No. 841, Gajendra Prakash in petition No. 842 and Bhupendra Prakash in Petition No. 843. It appears that the firm was reconstituted with effect from July 12, 1952, as on the preceding day Hirday Narain, the father, ceased to be a member of the firm. It appears that meanwhile Surendra Prakash, the fourth minor son, had become a major. In consequence of the reconstitution of the firm, the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1953-54 with which we are concerned in these petitions was split up into two partitions, one comprising of the period from the commencement of the accounting period on October 10, 1951, to July 11, 1952, until which date Hirday Narain, the father, continued to be a partner in the firm and the other period commencing subsequently to Hirday Narain ceasing to be a partner from July 12, 1952, to September 27, 1952, the end of the accounting period. In due course on March 28, 1956, an assessment order was made u/s 23(5)(a) against the firm in respect of the assessment year 1953-54. This order has not been made an annexure to the petition. An extract from that order has been quoted in paragraph 3 of the petition. It is not possible to say whether the extract represents the correct state of affairs which is necessary for the purpose of disposal of the petition. I cannot help observing that it is an entirely wrong practice to quote extracts from orders which form the backbone of a petition and not annex to the petitions complete copies of the orders from which extracts are sought to be relied on. To say the least this creates a suspicion against the bona fides of a petitioner. In the absence of complete copies of orders or documents it is not possible for the court to come to the conclusion that if the complete document had been produced before the court it might not have yielded a different result than that contended for on the basis of the extract from such order or document. Be that as it may, it appears from this extract that the apportionment of the income of the firm amongst the various partners of the firm was made for the two periods separately in specific sums of monies mentioned against the names of the different partners. The share income of the three partners and of their father is stated in that extract as follows :

It is also provided therein that "out of the above income the entire profit up to July 11, 1952, will be assessed in the hands of Hirday Narain u/s 16(3)(a)(ii)."

In consequence of this orders assessments were made against the father, Hirday Narain, and thre