JUDGMENT

R.M. Sahai, J. - Validity of the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other than officers) (Appointing Authorities) Ordinance, 1987 (U.P. Ordinance No. 9 of 1987) defining appointing authorities of the Corporation with effect from 19th June, 1981 has been assailed, in these petitions principally for being beyond legislative competence of the State and also because it transgresses the field already occupied by the Central enactment 64 of 1950. Subsidiary submissions like colourable exercise of power by the Governor in issuing the Ordinance without any material for forming the opinion that urgency existed, vagueness of its clauses, failure to remove the defects in the rules pointed out by this Court, legislative over-ruling of Judicial decision, breach of Article 14 etc. were also raised, although feebly, more with purpose of adding the number of challenges than with any expectation of their being accepted.

2. Necessity to issue the ordinance arose as this Court in Rashid Ahmad v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1986 U.P.L.B.E.C. 613 and Bhopal Singh v. Managing Directors, 1986 (12) A.L.R. 556 held that Preamble of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Service Regulations 1981 (referred to hereinafter as Regulations) framed under Section 45(c) read with Section 12(1)(c) of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (For brevity Transport Act), having superseded all existing resolutions resulted in supersession of the resolution passed by the Corporation, as it stood prior to 1982, including the resolution of 1974 delegating powers of appointing authority to various officers. And there being no fresh delegation the order of dismissal or termination passed by the authorities in pursuance of 1974 delegation was illegal and invalid. If the effect of the decision in Bhopal Singh's case would have remained confined to that case alone probably the Corporation would have submitted to it after the Special Leave petition was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court as in fact it did by reinstating petitioner. But it resulted in larger number of writ petitions by the employees who had been dismissed for misconduct etc. creating huge liability towards past arrears apart from problem of reinstating them. Thus an extraordinary situation arose. To overcome it the State Government issued the Ordinance removing the infirmity by creating fiction that an officer authorised by the Corporation prior to 1982 shall be deemed to have been authorised by the Board. It further validated action taken prior to issuance of the Ordinance.

3. Legislative power exercised under Article 213 of the Constitution was defended by the learned Advocate General by referring to entries 41 or 32 of list II or entry 35 of list III of seventh schedule. He urged that the legislature was competent to enact such law under either of the entries, therefore, the argument of legislative competence was liable to be rejected. Argued Learned Advocate General that even if the ordinance was not directly covered in any entry but it was included in it incidentally then so long it did not trench upon any matter covered by List I it was not repugnant and shall prevail. In the alternative it was submitted by the learned Advocate General that Parliament having delegated the power to frame regulations on service conditions under Section 14 of the Act on State it was conferment of executive power which taken to its logical conclusion under Article 162 extended to matter in respect of which the law could be made by legislature. Therefore, according to him, the ordinance was a valid piece of legislation the legality of which was unimpeachable.

4. Prior to embarking upon scrutiny of various provisions of the Transport Act to ascertain if the entire field was already occupied by the Central legislation therefore, the ordinance being in class with it was liable to be struck down a State Legislature had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned ordinance or the ordinance in t