JUDGMENT

H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a revision against the order dated March 5, 1971 of the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, dismissing Appeal No. 49 and confirming the final order dated October 11, 1968 of the Assistant Collector, First Class, district Kanpur, passed in the Execution Case No. 23 of 1968.

2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and have gone through the record.

3. The opposite party, Smt. Ramadevi, decree-holder, had filed an application for execution of the decree in a case under Sec. 202, UPZA and LR Act. The decree was obtained by her on January 31, 1964. An appeal against the judgment was, however, filed which was finally rejected by the District Judge on April 29, 1967. The application for execution was presented on April 27, 1968 and possession in pursuance of the decree was obtained on June 22, 1968. Therefore, the judgment-debtors Anantu and Kunji moved an application under Sections 47/144 and 151, Civil Procedure Code on July 1, 1968 in the trial court, alleging that the decree-holder had obtained possession after expiry of the period of limitation and, therefore, possession should be restored to them. The trial court by its order dated October 11, 1968 has rejected this application and confirmed the delivery of possession to the decree-holder. In appeal this order has been upheld by the Additional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner's order is being challenged in the present revision.

4. The learned counsel for the revisionists has taken the plea that there is an error on the question of limitation involved in the instant case since the courts below have not correctly interpreted the law of limitation. According to the learned counsel the decree had become final on January 31, 1964 and not on April, 29, 1967 and a time-barred appeal especially when there was no grant of stay order by the appellate court, coupled with the fact that the appeal had been originally filed in an incompetent appellate court, does not save the limitation to the decree-holder.

5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has, on the other hand, contended that the decree had become final only on April 29, 1967 when the appeal had been rejected and as such the execution of decree was not time-barred.

6. A number of rulings have been cited. In Nagendra Nath v. Suresh AIR 1932 Privy Council 165 their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question subjudice between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so ofter thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Nor in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court."

7. In Shoedan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar AIR 1966 SC 1332 a learned Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations:

"It is true the High Court dismissed the appeal arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 either on the ground that it was barred by limitation or on the ground that steps had not been taken for printing the records. Even so, the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was that the decrees of the Additional Civil Judge, who decided the issue as to title on merits the result of the High Court's decision is to conform the decision on the issue of the title which had been given on the merits by the Additional Civil Judge and thus in effect the High Court