Consent between parties close to the age of majority does not invoke provisions of POCSO Act, and medical age determination takes precedence over educational documents for assessing age of victim.

JUDGMENT :

ABDUL SHAHID, J.

1. Heard Sri Prem Prakash Yadav, learned counsel for the revisionist and learned A.G.A. for the State. None is present for the Opposite Party No. 2 despite service of notice.

2. The instant Criminal Revision has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.9.2025 passed by the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, POCSO Act, (Exclusive) Jaunpur in S.S.T. No. 124 of 2024 ( State Vs. Akash Yadav, arising out of Case Crime No. 78 of 2024, under Section 376 IPC and Section 5 /6 POCSO Act, P.S. Mugrbadshahpur, District Jaunpur.

3. Learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the learned trial court has ignored the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C. which shows material contradictions regarding the alleged age of the prosecutrix. The medical report of the prosecutrix as stated, the age of the prosecutrix as approximately 18 years on the date of medical examination, although her age was 18 plus (1-2) is equal to 19-20 years. This contradicts the school certificate which suggest her date of birth dated 20.11.2007, mentioning her age nearly 18 years at the time of the alleged incident i.e. on 6.3.2024. It creates a doubt as to her minor status under the POCSO Act.

4. Learned trial court while rejecting the discharge application of the revisionist has ignored the documents suggested prior to consensual relationship between them. The statement of the prosecutrix itself shows that she had met with him 3-4 times before the incident. The rejection of the discharge application had not adequately been considered that voluntarily relationship between the parties, close to the age of majority neither comes under the POCSO Act nor under Section 376 IPC is made out where the victim is major and the parties had entered into consensual relationship.

5. Learned counsel for the revisionist relied on the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rohini and another Vs. State of U.P. and others , 2025 LawSuit (All) 1263. It is passed in the Habeas Corpus writ petition. In para-25 of the aforesaid case, the School Transfer Certificate was produced to prove the age of the child. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the School Transfer Certificate cannot be relied upon to determine the age of the child under the Act of 2015. In this context, the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para Nos. 14,18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below:-

[25] In the aforesaid case, the school transfer certificate was produced to prove the age of the child. The Supreme Court held that a school transfer certificate cannot be relied upon to determine the age of child under the Act, 2015. In this context, the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph nos. 14, 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below:-

"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997.

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