Writ jurisdiction cannot be used to legitimize or protect live-in relationships that serve as substitutes for marriages prohibited by statutory age thresholds. Courts will not restrain parents from taking lawful preventive measures under child-protection statutes despite claims of personal liberty.

JUDGMENT :

GARIMA PRASHAD, J.

1. Heard Sri Mahipal Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ashwani Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners asserting that they are residing together as a couple in a live-in relationship. Petitioner no.1 is a woman aged about 20 years and petitioner no.2 is a male aged about 19 years. It is pleaded that petitioner no.1 belongs to the Muslim community whereas petitioner no.2 belongs to a Scheduled Caste Hindu family.

3. It is stated that the father of petitioner no.1 has been threatening them and pressuring them to sever their relationship, though the parents of the petitioner No.2 have no objection to such a relationship. Hence, by means of the present writ petition, the petitioners seek directions to the respondent police authorities to restrain their family members not to interfere in their cohabitation as a live-in relationship, further to ensure protection of their life and liberty, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the parties cannot solemnize marriage under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 since the Petitioner no.2 boy is only 19 years old and has not yet completed the age of 21 years as required by law to marry.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the orders passed by this Court in similar matters wherein protection has been granted to couples who were living in a live-in relationship and that no one can interfere in their peaceful living. It is submitted that the petitioners are majors and they have the right to live-in with a person of their own choice with or without marriage.

6. Per contra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel opposed the prayer placing reliance upon the provisions of the Special Marraige Act, 1954, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2006 Act”). It is contended that the petitioner No.2, being below the age of 21 years, falls within the definition of “Child” thus he cannot solemnise marriage under any of the above laws. It was urged that where the legislature itself has treated a male below the age of 21 years as lacking legal capacity to enter into marriage, the Court ought not to indirectly permit a marriage- like relationship under the rubric of a live-in arrangement. It was further submitted that statutory policy concerning age, maturity and legal capacity cannot be neutralised through a broad invocation of Article 21. It is argued that permitting such a relationship would defeat the legislative intent underlying the statutory framework governing marriageable age.

7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material brought on record, the core issue which arises for consideration is:

Whether this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, can grant protection to a live-in relationship where one of the parties (male) is below 21 years of age and is statutoril