JUDGMENT

R.C. Khulbe, J. - By means of this writ petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks to quash the impugned FIR bearing No.28 of 2021 registered under Sections 383, 465, 420, 504, 120-B IPC at P.S. Kotwali Jwalapur, District Haridwar.

2. The parties have filed the above-numbered compounding application to show that they have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably. The aggrieved Vaibhav Bansal and the petitioner-Aman Kumar Goel are present before the Court today being duly identified by their respective counsel. They are fairly submitted that the compromise has taken place between them; the aggrieved Vaibhav Bansal fairly submitted that an affidavit is also submitted by his wife, who is serving at present Hyderabad; they did not want to pursue the matter because simply it was purely a business dispute between them regarding sale and purchase of gold.

3. Learned counsel for the State opposes the compounding application.

4. It is contended by learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the offences punishable under Sections 420, 504 IPC are compoundable whereas offences under Sections 383, 465 and 120-B IPC are non-compoundable offences.

5. The Apex Court has dealt with the consequence of a compromise in regard to non-compoundable offences in the case of B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 and has held as below: -

"6. In Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [(1998) 5 SCC 749], this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal’s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye’s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

10. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors. [(1977) 2 SCC 699], considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not