The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the provisions of Section 6(N) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 regarding termination of services and the definition of 'industry' under the Act.

JUDGMENT :

The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners –State has put a challenge to the award dated 01.11.2010 as it was passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar in Adjudication Case No.414 of 2009, “Sahdev Singh Vs. Adhishashi Abhiyanta, Nalkoop Khand, Roorkee, District Haridwar”, wherein the reference made under Section 4(K) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act of 1947”) with regards to the illegal termination of the services of the private respondent has been answered against the State and in favour of the workman.

2. As a consequence to the aforesaid adjudication made by the Labour Court, the Labour Court has drawn an opinion that termination of the workman was held to be illegal and hence, he was held to be entitled to all the service benefits from the date of the termination and would be treated to be in services throughout. But, however, the backwages were not paid to the respondent-workman.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the workman has contended that he was employed with the petitioners / employer in its Nalkoop Khand as an Assistant Mechanic as back as on 11.04.1985. He contends, that he had continuously discharged his responsibilities in the said capacity but, all of a sudden, his services were orally terminated on 18.06.1987 without assigning any reason or after a prior notice. It is contended that the manner in which the services were terminated it would amount to being a retrenchment despite of the fact that the respondent-workman contends that he has worked over 240 days in a calendar year. Hence, he contends that, act of oral termination of his services as made by an order of 18.06.1987, would be arbitrary and bad since being in violation to the provisions contained under Section 6 (N) of the Act of 1947, in the absence of there being any prior notice given to the workman by the petitioners/ employer; about their intention to terminate services of the workman, who contends to have worked regularly ever since 11.04.1985.

4. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the workman before the learned Labour Court, that the oral termination dated 18.06.1987 would be bad in the eyes of the law because, if there was any stigma with regards to rendering of his services, the respondent ought to have resorted to a disciplinary proceeding by issuing a chargesheet, conducting the domestic inquiry and then could have dispensed with his services and having not done so, it would be in violation of the provisions contained under Section 6(N) of the Act of 1947, for the reason being, that petitioner contends that when he was appointed on 01.04.1985 as an Assistant Mechanic, he was appointed as against the permanent post and thus, after taking work from him even after his termination, would be in violation to the provisions contained under Section 6(O) of the Act of 1947.

5. Another limb of argument of the workman before the learned Labour Court was that an identically placed employees, who were subsequently with the department, since they had been retained and they continued to work, the action of the respondent of termination of the services of the workman on 18.06.1987 would be in violation of the provisions of Section 6(P) of the Act of 1947.

6. On the other hand, the petitioners’ case before the learned Labour Court, as pressed, was from the following perspective:-

1) That the appointment of the respondent-workman was as a part-time Assistant Mechanic and it was contended that he was appointed for a fix term of three years and he had never worked for three years and, hence, his dispensation of services w.e.f. 18.06.1987, by an oral order, was absolutely justified, since the respondent-workman is contended to have no lien, as such to the post against which he was appointed as Assistant Mechanic, as such, compliance of Section 6 (N) of the Act of 1947, according to the petitioners, was not mandatory.

2) Besides this, a very peculiar exception ha