IMPORTANT POINT
A notice under Section 138 must clearly demand the cheque amount; ambiguity can invalidate proceedings, but if the demand is sufficiently clear, the notice is valid.

JUDGMENT :

Rakesh Thapliyal, J.

1. In all these C482 petitions, identical issues are involved, and, therefore, all are being decided by a common order.

2. In all the cases, separate complaints were filed by the respondent under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, pending in the court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate/1st Addl. Civil Judge, (Sr. Div.), Haridwar. In these complaints, process were initiated and the applicants were summoned and now the proceeding of each of the complaint case has been challenged in these C482 applications on the ground that the notices issued to the applicants does not contain raising of demand, and, as such, the same does not fulfil the requirement of Section 138 of N.I. Act which invalidates the entire proceedings.

3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same, taken as their face value make out absolutely no case against the applicants/accused and the complaint also does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence which is alleged against the accused. The main contention of the learned counsel for the applicant for challenging the proceedings is that the learned Magistrate have not considered that in the mandatory notice there is no demand at all for the cheque amount. In reference to this, the learned counsel for the applicant shows the notice dated 22.01.2020, in order to establish that in the said notice there is no demand of the amount as shown in the cheque, and, as such, the proceedings cannot be initiated on the complaint moved by the respondent.

4. In reference to this, learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others, (1976) 3 SCC 736. By giving reference of this judgment, learned counsel for the applicant submits that in para 5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

“5. ………………………Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside:

(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings.

5. Apart from this, another judgment has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant i.e. in the case of K.K. Indira Vs. Dr. G. Adinarayana, (2003) 8 SCC 300, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

“11. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on Suman Sethi case [(2000) 2 SCC 380 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 414] to contend that if the indication in the notice of other amounts than that covered by the cheque issued, does not as held by this Court invalidate the notice, there is no reason as to why a consolidated notice for two complainants cannot be issued. The extreme plea as is sought to be raised in this case based upon Suman Sethi case [(2000) 2 SCC 380 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 414] is clearly untenable. Though no formal notice is prescribed in the pr