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1958 Supreme(MP) 226

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
M. Hidayatullah, C. J. and P. K. Tare, J.
BHANU - Appellant
Versus
DALMIA AND CO. - Respondents
Civil Revn. 201 Of 1957
Decided On : 09/23/1958

Advocates Appeared:
A.S.USMANI, Y.S.DHARMADHIKARI

The court has the power to extend the time for payment of court fees beyond the initial time granted, after the dismissal of a pauper application, if sufficient cause is shown.

Headnote:

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 149 - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PAYMENT OF COURT FEES - COURT'S POWER TO EXTEND TIME AFTER INITIAL GRANT - SUFFICIENCY OF CAUSE - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit in forma pauperis, which was dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiff was granted 15 days to pay the requisite court fees, but failed to do so within the time initially granted. He then filed an application for further extension of time, which was rejected by the trial court.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the trial court had the power to extend the time for payment of court fees beyond the initial 15 days granted, as Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers the court to extend time as and when found necessary, except when the dismissal or rejection is automatic without further reference to the court.

Issues: Whether the court has the power to extend the time for payment of court fees beyond the initial time granted, after the dismissal of a pauper application.

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the Privy Council decision in Stuart Skinner v. William Orde, which held that an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis consists of two parts: (a) the prayer for being allowed to sue as a pauper, and (b) the essential ingredients constituting the plaint. If the application (b) be dismissed there still remains the plaint (a), and if time is given to pay court-fee and it is paid, the plaint is good from the time when the plaint (a) was filed.

Final Decision: The court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the trial court had the power to extend the time for payment of court fees beyond the initial 15 days granted, as Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers the court to extend time as and when found necessary, except when the dismissal or rejection is automatic without further reference to the court.

P. K. TARE, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code has been filed by the plaintiff against the order of Shri S. R. Tiwari, Second Civil Judge, Chhindwara rejecting, by order dated 3-5-1957, the plaintiff-applicant's prayer for further extension of time for payment of the court-fees, after his application for permission to sue in forma pauperis was rejected and 15 days' time initially granted, had already expired.

( 2 ) BY order dated 9-4-1957, the trial Judge dismissed the plaintiff's application for permission to sue in forma pauperis, and by the same order, the plaintiff was granted 15 days' time to pay the requisite court-fees of Rs. 100/ -. The plaintiff, however, failed to pay the court-fees within the time initially granted. The plaintiff had purchased a court-fee stamp of Rs. 100/- on the 16th day of the said order dated 9-4-1957. The said stamp was filed in court by the plaintiff's counsel on 294-1957 i. e. on the 20th day.

( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge by an exhaustive and well written order dated 3-5-1957, after considering various authorities of different High Courts, came to the conclusion that he had no power to extend the time, beyond the one granted at the time of dismissing the pauper application. '

( 4 ) THERE is considerable conflict of authorities on the question, whether the court, while rejecting the pauper application can pass an order granting time for payment of court-fees under Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is not necessary for me to enter into that controversy in view of the reported case of this Court, namely, Chudaman v. Babaji, decided by Bobde J. and reported in ILR (1944) Nag 623 : (AIR 1944 Nag 357 ). The proposition laid down by this ruling does not solve the question in the present case. I do feel that I am bound by the view expressed in the case of ILR (1944)Nag 623 : (AIR 1944 Nag 357) (supra), but the further question involved in the present case is whether, after having initially granted time for payment of court-fees at the time of dismissing the pauper application, the court can further extend time under Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code. So far as I have seen the various authorities, which I shall presently advert to, none of the cases has touched this aspect of the question.

( 5 ) THE ratio decidendi of the various rulings appears to be that, till the time the court rejects the pauper application, it has seisin of the case, but, once the pauper application is dismissed, the court becomes functus officio. It is on this basis that some of the High Courts have taken the view that time can be granted, when the court dismisses the pauper application. On this reasoning, the court would lose seisin of the case, when it dismisses the pauper application and, therefore, the court would have power to grant extension of time only till it dismisses the pauper application, but, not subsequently.

( 6 ) IN Rajkumar v. Shriniwas, Civil Revn. No. 685 of 1953, D/- 18-1-1955 (Nag), hidayatullah C. J. relying on the case of ILR (1944) Nag 623 : (AIR 1944 Nag 357), held that the lower court, while rejecting the pauper application, ought to have granted time for payment of the court fees. In the case of Jagadiswari Debi v. Tinkari Bibi, ILR 62 Cal 711 : (AIR 1936 Cal 28), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court following the pronouncement of their lordships of the Privy Council in the ease of Stuart Skinner v. William Orde, 6 Ind app 126, took the view that the court, while rejecting the pauper application, had jurisdiction to extend time for payment of court fees under Section 149 of the Civil procedure Code. The contrary view was rejected by the learned Judges as being opposed not only to the specific wording of Section 149, Civil Procedure Code, but also to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council. The said case was relied on by another Division Bench in the case of Kali Dasi v. Santosh Kumar, ILR (1939) 1 cal 112 : (AIR 1938 Cal 730 ).











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