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High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
P. K. Tare, J.
LALCHAND RAMCHAND JAIN - Appellant
Versus
KANHAIYALAL RAMBHAROSE - Respondents
Misc. (First) Appeal 156 Of 1959
Decided On : 10/17/1960
LIMITATION ACT - ARTICLE 182 - STARTING POINT - DATE OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER - DECREE OR ORDER NOT DRAWN UP - SECTION 12 (2) - APPLICABILITY - EXECUTION APPLICATION - SECTION 15 (1) - APPLICABILITY - ACTUS CURIAE NEMINEM GRAVABIT - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
The decree-holder filed an application for execution for recovery of costs awarded by the Judicial Commissioner. The judgment-debtor raised the objection that the application was barred by time under Article 182 of the Limitation Act as it had been filed more than three years after the date of the delivery of the order. The executing court overruled this objection and held that as the decree in the appeal was framed and signed on 26th October 1956 and the costs were taxed in the revision petition on 20th October 1956, limitation would start from these dates, and the execution application was thus within time.
Finding of the Court:
1. The starting point of limitation for execution of a decree under Article 182 (1) of the Limitation Act is the date of delivery of judgment, as provided by Order 20 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application for execution. 3. Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to exclude the period between the date of delivery of judgment and the actual signing of the decree. 4. The principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit can be invoked in favor of a party who has been misled by a wrong action of the Court, such as mentioning an incorrect date of decree or order in the certified copies supplied to the party.
Issues: 1. Whether the starting point of limitation for execution of a decree under Article 182 (1) of the Limitation Act is the date of delivery of judgment or the date of signing of the decree? 2. Whether Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application for execution? 3. Whether Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act can be invoked to exclude the period between the date of delivery of judgment and the actual signing of the decree? 4. Whether the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit can be invoked in favor of a party who has been misled by a wrong action of the Court, such as mentioning an incorrect date of decree or order in the certified copies supplied to the party?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The starting point of limitation for execution of a decree under Article 182 (1) of the Limitation Act is the date of delivery of judgment, as provided by Order 20 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. This is in accordance with the dicta laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in ILR 7 Cal 547 (PC) and ILR 17 Cal 347 (PC). 2. Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application for execution. This is because Section 12 (2) only applies to appeals, applications for leave to appeal and applications for review of judgments, as understood in their technical sense. 3. Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to exclude the period between the date of delivery of judgment and the actual signing of the decree. This is because Section 15 (1) only applies to cases where the execution of a decree has been stayed by injunction or order of the Court. 4. The principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit can be invoked in favor of a party who has been misled by a wrong action of the Court, such as mentioning an incorrect date of decree or order in the certified copies supplied to the party. However, in the present case, the respondent was not misled by any wrong action of the Court, and therefore the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit cannot be invoked in his favor.
Final Decision: The appeal is allowed and the respondent's execution application is dismissed as barred by time.
( 1 ) THIS reference by my learned brother Tare, J. arises out of an appeal by the judgment-debtor against an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Panna, in execution proceedings of a decree. The decree under execution was drawn up on 26th October 1956 consequent to the orders pronounced by the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, on 23rd December 1955 in a miscellaneous civil appeal and a civil revision. When the decree-holder filed an application for execution for recovery of costs awarded by the Judicial Commissioner the judgment-debtor-appellant raised the objection that the application was barred by time under Article 182 of the Limitation Act as it had been filed more than three years after the date of the delivery of the order viz. 23rd December 1955. This objection was overruled by the executing court which held that as the decree in the appeal was framed and signed on 26th October 1956 and the costs were taxed in the revision petition on 20th October 1956, limitation would start from these dates, and the execution application was thus within time. The judgment-debtor then appealed to this Court.
( 2 ) WHEN the appeal came up for hearing before my learned brother sitting singly, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that under Article 182 (1) the limitation would begin to run from the date on which the Judicial Commissioner pronounced the order and not from the date on which the decree was formally drawn up or an order taxing the costs in the revision, petition was signed. Reliance was placed on Nathulal v. Nandram, 1959 MPLJ 1065: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108 ). In reply, the respondent contended on the authority of Bhagwant v. Liquidator, Co-operative Society, Sarphapur, ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB) that the decree-holder would be entitled to ask for the exclusion under Section 12 of the Limitation Act of the period intervening between the pronouncement of the orders in the appeal and the revision petition and the date on which the decree was signed or costs were taxed. It was also pointed out before the learned Single-Judge that in 1959 MPLJ 1065: AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108 reliance was placed on Unida v. Rupchand, AIR 1927 Nag 1 (FB) which had already been dissented from in ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB ). The matter has now been referred to this Bench for a decision on the question of limitation arising in the appeal.
( 3 ) IN connection with the question whether the respondent's application for execution was within time, two points arise for consideration. One is as regards the date from which limitation would run under Article 182 (1) and the other is as to whether under Section 12 Limitation Act the decree-holder is entitled to deduct the period between the date of the judgment and the date on which the decree was signed in computing the period of limitation for the execution application. So far as the first point is concerned, it is no longer res integra. In ILR (1965) Nag 791 itself the Full Bench has observed that by the Code of Civil Procedure the decree bears the date of the judgment and that limitation runs from the date of the judgment irrespective of the fact when the decree is drawn up. The decision in 1959 MPLJ 1065: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108) only holds that under Article 182 (1) the date of the decree means the date of the judgmentand that limitation for an application for execution commences from the date of pronouncement of judgment and not from the date when the decree is actually prepared and signed. That decision in no way runs counter to what has been observed in Bhagwant's case, ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB ). In Nathulal's case, 1959 MP LJ 1065: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108) (supra) reference was no doubt made to the Full Bench decision of the late Judicial Commissioner's Court in AIR 1927 Nag 1. But that was for the purpose of showing that in that case also the question of exclusion of time under Section 12 (2) Limitation Act was considered because of the undisputed proposition that limitation ran f
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