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1989 Supreme(MP) 48

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
T. N. SINGH, K. K. VERMA
GANGAVISHAN HEERALAL - Appellant
Versus
GOPAL DIGAMBAR JAIN - Respondents
L. P. A. 1 Of 1980
Decided On : 02/08/1989

Advocates Appeared:
B.S.Agrawal, H.K.JAIN, K.K.LAHOTI

An order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be challenged in a Letters Patent Appeal, and the High Court will not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike down such an order.

Headnote:

LETTERS PATENT APPEAL - MAINTAINABILITY - ORDER PASSED BY SINGLE JUDGE IN APPEAL AGAINST ORDER OF DISTRICT JUDGE IN EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS - WHETHER MAINTAINABLE - ORDER PASSED BY DISTRICT JUDGE - WHETHER VOID - JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT UNDER ART. 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, a judgment-debtor, challenged the validity of an order passed by the District Judge in execution proceedings, directing the issuance of a Sale Certificate in favor of the auction-purchaser. The appellant argued that the sale was conducted with material irregularity as the auction-purchaser failed to deposit 25% of the purchase-money on the date of auction as required by law.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable as the order passed by the District Judge could not be regarded as a "decree" under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. The appellant had rightly preferred an appeal against that order under Order 43, Rule 1, C.P.C., which was entertained and disposed of by the learned single Judge. The High Court also declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike down the order passed by the District Judge, holding that it would not be proper to allow the judgment-debtor to avoid an order lawfully passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

Issues: 1. Whether the Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable? 2. Whether the order passed by the District Judge was void? 3. Whether the High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike down the order passed by the District Judge?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The order passed by the District Judge could not be regarded as a "decree" under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, and therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. 2. The order passed by the District Judge was not void as it was passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. 3. The High Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike down the order passed by the District Judge, holding that it would not be proper to allow the judgment-debtor to avoid an order lawfully passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

Final Decision: The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed.

T. N. SINGH, J.

( 1 ) IN this appeal, the question of maintainability has been raised as a thres hold objection to its hearing. That question, we propose to consider and dispose of first.

( 2 ) THE judgment-debtor is the appellant and he came to this Court assailing validity of an order passed on 30-1-1979 by District Judge, Morena, in Execution Proceedings. By that order, the Court directed Sale Certificate to issue in favour of the auction-purchaser for the property auctioned on 22-11-1978. His objection against the "sale" was that the sale had been conducted with material irregularity inasmuch as the auction-purchaser's application dated 23-11-1978 could not have been allowed for allowing him to make deposit of 25% of the amount of the purchase-money as he had not made that deposit in accordance with law on the date of auction, namely, 22-11-1978. Admittedly, that amount was deposited on 24-11-1978 and the balance on 7-12-1978. A learned single Judge of this Court, by his order passed on 13-11-1979 in Misc. Appeal No. 14 of 1979, dismissed the appeal.

( 3 ) EVEN for considering and deciding the preliminary objection to maintainability, of the instant appeal, some facts are necessary to be stated. A money-decree was passed on 14-7-1976 against the instant appellant for a sum of Rs. 34,200. 50 with interest and also costs and Execution was levied in respect there of on 15-11-1976. In that proceeding, certain house property was attached and put to sale. The first sale aborted when by an order passed on 3-12-1977, District Judge, Morena ordered refund of the 25% deposit made at the time of auction because the remaining amount of bid-money had remained undeposited till then. In the resale, proceedings protracted and eventually, respondent No. 2 Govind Singh made a bid for Rs. 72,000/- which, as per order passed by District Judge Morena, was knocked down on 22-1-1978 Admittedly the requisite earnestmoney of 25%, amounting to Rs. 18,000/- was not deposited and by the same order, he was allowed to do so on 24-11-1978. The order impugned in appeal before the learned single Judge was passed on 30-1-1979 by learned District Judge by which he rejected the application of the judgment-debtor, the instant appellant, and made the sale absolute directing Sale Certificate to issue in favour of the auction-purchaser, Govind Singh.

( 4 ) APPELLANT's counsel Shri N. K. Jain made a twofold contention, replying to the objection of miaintainability of the instant appeal. Counsel has relied on the provisions of Cls. (a), (p) and (q) of S. 97 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, in support, of his first contention. In so far as reliance on Cls. (a) and (q) is concerned the least said is the best. The 1976 Amendment Act came into force from 1-2-1977 and on that date, admittedly, the appeal preferred by the judgment-debtor before the learned single Judge was not pending, it was filed on 19-2-1979. Accordingly, Cl. (a) has no application to the instant case. About Cl. (p), suffice it to say that reliance thereon is wholly misconceived inasmuch as there is no relevance of S. 141 of C. P. C. to the Execution Proceedings in respect where of provisions of O. 21, only are to be applied. However, something has to be said to on Cl. (q) which we extract :" (A) The provisions of Rr. 31, 32, 48a, 57 to 59, 90 and 97 to 103 of O. XXI of the First Schedule as amended or, as the case may be substituted or inserted by S. 72 of this Act shall not apply to or affect - (i) Any attachment subsisting immediately before the commencement of the said S. 72, or (ii) any suit instituted before commencement under R. 63 aforesaid to establish right to attached property or under R. 103 aforesaid to establish possession, or (iii) any proceeding to set aside the sale of any immovable property. "and every such attachment, suit or proceeding shall be continued as it the said S. 72 had not come into force: 4a. Although reliance is placed by Shri Jain on sub-Cl. (







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