( 1 ) TWO Division Benches of this Court having expressed conflicting views on a legal question, the State Transport Authority, for short, Authority or S. T. A. , noted the dilomma and made an earnest endeavour to steer clear of the judicial controversy in passing the impugned order, Annexure-D, on 15-6-1972. However, that ingenuity was a short-lived one inasmuch as that order being challenged before a learned single Judge of this Court in this petition, he referred the controversy to a Division Bench and that Bench, in turn, referred for the opinion of a Larger Bench, the following question :-"whether the permit-holder has a right under any provision of law or under inherent powers of the Court, to get the period of permit extended for the period during which the permit remained suspended?"

( 2 ) BECAUSE we have taken the view that it is necessary to finally dispose of this matter to make amends for the unintended and fortuitous proerastination, it is necessary to state first few facts for that purpose. The petitioner was granted a permanent stage carriage permit on Datia Chhatarpur via Jhansi, Mauranipur route which was valid from 16-3-1969 to 15-1-1972. The grant was challenged by respondents 2 and 3 in appeal before State Transport Appellate Tribunal, for short, 'tribunal'. Unfortunately, final decision in that appeal was rendered rather belatedly on 22-2-1972, albeit dismissing the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, an ex parte interim stay was granted on 4-8-1969 which was confirmed on 3-9-1969 after interparte hearing in that regard. As the petitioner succeeded and became entitled to resume operation, he applied to Tribunal complaining that he had to cease operation from 4-1-1969 to 10-3-1972 and be given necessary relief by extending the life of the permit to make up the loss. By order Annexure-A/1 passed on 20-4-1972 the Tribunal held that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of the period for which he had to suspend operation because of the stay order passed by the Authority. He then moved the Authority to grant extension of permit accordingly, but by the impugned order the prayer was rejected.

( 3 ) IN the impugned order, the basis for rejection of the prayer stated is "in the absence of any mandatory provision, we cannot grant this extension which defeats the intention of the Legislature". To reach this conclusion, justification was found in the changed circumstances of the case. Indeed, in the meantime, the scheme No. 30-M was published under Section 68-C, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the 'act', and the route in question was found overlapping a portion of the notified route as a result of which the Authority found its jurisdiction impaired by the mandate of Section 68-F (1-D) of the Act. The Authority entertained the view that by granting the extension prayed on the basis of Tribunal's order, Section 68-F (1-D) would be defeated. Inasmuch as, that provision was legislated to facilitate the task of nationalisation and refusal to enforce the provision would result in the intention of the Legislature being defeated.

( 4 ) WE may refer now to the conflicting views of this Court of two Division Benches which really form the focus of the controversy mooted in the instant reference. The decision in Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Ltd. v. Raipur Transport Co. Ltd. (M. P. No. 254 of 1987) was heard and decided by a learned single and his decision was confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 60 of 1968 in following terms :"4. This brings us to the next contention, viz. that the secretary had no power to grant a permit for the unexpired portion which was not available to the Raipur Transport Co. by reason of the stay. It was contended that the duration of the permit as noted in it had expired by then, and there was no direction either by the Appellate Authority or by the R. T. A. that a fresh permit be granted. In our opinion, it is the duty of Courts and tribunals to see that wrong order