The prosecution for perjury should be directed in the larger interest of the administration of justice, and there must be a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance before ordering prosecution.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the plaintiff under Section 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Code') against the order dated 19-12-2000 in M. J. C. No. 37 of 1996 of the 9th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur by which her application under Section 340 of the Code for prosecuting R. D. Agrawal, an Officer of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation for perjury punishable under Section 193, I. P. C. has been rejected.

( 2 ) PLAINTIFF Kamalvasini Agrawal had instituted Civil Suit No. 150-A of 1995 for eviction of defendant-Hindustan Petroleum Corporation under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on the ground that the suit accommodation was bona fide required by her for carrying on her own business. That suit was decreed on 22-1-1996. During the pendency of that suit R. D. Agrawal, an Officer of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, was examined as a witness on behalf of the defendant. He deposed before the Court that : "there is a plot measuring 7000 sq. ft. behind the suit accommodation on which the construction can be carried out". According to the plaintiff this was a false statement made by non-applicant R. D. Agrawal (D. W. 2) as there was no such plot behind the suit accommodation. In his deposition dated 1-7-1966 it is shown that there is a vacant plot of land behind the suit accommodation. The area of that plot was 100 x 55 feet.

( 3 ) THE trial Court in a well considered order keeping in view the relevant principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in several decisions held : "it is not expedient in the interest of justice" to prosecute R. D. Agrawal for the offence of perjury. The trial Court was of the opinion that he has not intentionally given any false evidence and prima facie he has not committed any perjury. It was also observed that the Officer of the Corporation was not going to have any advantage in making the said statement and the explanation given by him in his evidence was quite satisfactory.

( 4 ) IN this appeal it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that there was no plot of 7000 sq, ft. behind the suit accommodation and, therefore, the statement made by R. D. Agrawal was prima facie false and it was incumbent upon the trial Court to file a complaint against him as required by Section 340 of the Code. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Re : Suo Motu Proceedings against R. Karuppan, (2001) 5 SCC 289 : (2001 Cri LJ 2611), has been cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his argument. It has been observed in this decision by the Supreme Court that unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant falsehood in the Courts which has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact, though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the Courts despite taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let loose by vested interest and professional litigants. The mere existence of the penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the Courts stop to take an evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to survive, effective action is the need of the time. An earlier decision of the Supreme Court in K. Karunakaran v. T. V. Eachara Varrier, (1978) 1 SCC 18 : (1978 Cri LJ 339) has also been cited.

( 5 ) THE aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court were made in a different 'fact-situation', the same cannot be lifted and fitted in an altogether different context. In the said judgment there is a quotation which depicts the correct legal position. It is pointed out therein that perjury was committed when, after a 'lawful oath' was administered in a 'judicial proceeding', a p